Overreach on the High Seas?: Whether Federal Maritime Law Preempts California\u27s Vessel Fuel Rules by Easterbrooks, Bradley D.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 3 Article 3
4-15-2012
Overreach on the High Seas?: Whether Federal
Maritime Law Preempts California's Vessel Fuel
Rules
Bradley D. Easterbrooks
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Law of the Sea Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bradley D. Easterbrooks Overreach on the High Seas?: Whether Federal Maritime Law Preempts California's Vessel Fuel Rules , 39 Pepp. L.
Rev. 3 (2013)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol39/iss3/3
DO NOT DELETE 3/14/2012 2:25 PM 
 
645 
Overreach on the High Seas?: 
Whether Federal Maritime Law 
Preempts California’s                  
Vessel Fuel Rules 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
II.   BACKGROUND 
A.   Admiralty Jurisdiction and Substantive Maritime Law 
B.   Concurrent Legislative and Regulatory Powers 
C.   Concurrent Jurisdiction and International Law 
III.   CARB ENACTS OFFSHORE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 
A.   California’s First Attempt at Emissions Regulations 
B.   Retooled: California’s Current Ocean-Going Vessel Fuel 
Regulations 
C.   CARB’s Unintended Consequences 
IV.   WHETHER CALIFORNIA’S VESSEL FUEL RULES ARE PREEMPTED 
A.   Whether the Clean Air Act Preempts the Vessel Fuel Rules 
B.   MARPOL Annex VI: An International Framework 
C.   The Submerged Lands Act and Extraterritorial Concerns 
D.   Federal Interest in Uniformity: Common Law Preemption 
in Maritime Law 
1. State Regulation Is Not Afforded a Presumption 
Against Preemption when It Bears upon Maritime 
Commerce 
2. Balancing the Federal Interest in Uniformity with the 
State’s Interest in Regulation 
V.   CONCLUSION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Some Californians still remember the casino gambling boats that, 
decades ago, were anchored off the Los Angeles coastline.  In the 1930s, 
gambling was illegal in California, but people could take a ferry and board 
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the Rex, a floating casino anchored just three miles from the coast.1  The 
state’s territorial boundary—and thus its jurisdiction to enforce its laws—
ended three miles from its coastline.2  Eventually, California ended the 
practice of allowing offshore gambling when the Attorney General 
unilaterally sent law enforcement to lay siege to the Rex and sink its 
gambling equipment, a move that was challenged as unconstitutional at the 
time.3 
Similarly today, California seeks to regulate maritime activity off its 
coast in ways that appear constitutionally suspect.4  In 2007, the California 
Air Resources Board (CARB) enacted regulations to reduce ocean-going 
vessel emissions, measured by limits on certain chemicals in diesel fuel.5  
The rules were to be enforced against vessels traveling within twenty-four 
miles of the California coastline, which is twenty-one miles beyond the 
state’s territorial boundary.6  The Pacific Merchant Shipping Association 
(PMSA) challenged the regulations in court, and the Ninth Circuit held that 
the emissions caps were preempted by the Clean Air Act (CAA).7  CARB 
subsequently retooled the regulations, framing them as direct fuel content 
requirements instead of emissions caps, and enacted the current Vessel Fuel 
Rules (VFR) in 2009.8  California’s claim that it has the power to prescribe 
specific fuel content requirements for vessels traveling in interstate and 
international waters is a relatively novel contention.  No state has ever 
asserted such a broad extraterritorial regulatory authority, especially in light 
of the historic constraints placed on state regulation under federal maritime 
law.9 
One of the most obvious historic constraints on state jurisdiction in the 
field of maritime law has been the Constitution itself.  Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution gives federal courts jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime 
 
 1.  See The Era of the Gambling Ships & the Battle of Santa Monica Bay, LAALMANAC.COM, 
http://www.laalmanac.com/history/hi06ee.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (“1928 saw the appearance 
of the first of the gambling ships that floated off the Los Angeles County coastline.  Although it was 
illegal to conduct a gambling operation in California, the state’s jurisdiction only extended three 
miles offshore.  There was nothing in Federal law that forbid gambling, so operators of floating 
gambling casinos merely had to anchor just outside the three mile limit.”). 
 2.  See id. 
 3.  See id.  Despite the shipowner’s contention that its practices were legal under federal law, 
California’s then-Attorney General, Earl Warren, sent ships to lay siege to the Rex in 1939.  Id.  
After eight days under siege, the Rex surrendered, and its gambling equipment was tossed into the 
sea.  Id.  That incident was not the Rex’s last brush with danger on the high seas.  Id.  After being put 
into war service during World War II, she was captured and sunk by a German submarine off the 
coast of Africa.  Id. 
 4.  See infra notes 143–47 and accompanying text. 
 5.  See infra notes 143–47 and accompanying text. 
 6.  See infra notes 144–53 and accompanying text. 
 7.  Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene (PMSA I), 517 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008); 
see also infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 8.  See infra notes 161–71 and accompanying text. 
 9.  See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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cases.10  This jurisdictional grant has been used by federal courts to develop 
a federal common law in maritime.11  This law reaches as far as the 
admiralty court jurisdiction extends.12  Because federal law is supreme over 
state law, a concurrent federal-state maritime jurisdiction has developed, in 
which states retain only a right to supplement, but not otherwise contravene, 
federal maritime law as espoused by Congress and the federal courts.13 
In accordance with these principles, federal common law in maritime (in 
addition to congressional legislation) may preempt state regulations that are 
inconsistent, even if Congress has not acted.  In Southern Pacific Co. v. 
Jensen, the Supreme Court held that a state may supplement federal 
maritime law as long as its regulation does not interfere with, inter alia, 
federal interests in the uniformity of maritime law in its interstate and 
international relations.14  Attempts to construe the reach and limits of this 
holding, however, have been compared to navigating “a sailboat into a fog 
bank.”15 
Making a determination as to the permissibility of California’s VFR 
under federal law requires just such an endeavor.  California’s strong interest 
in pollution regulation overlaps and may compete with a number of federal 
interests, including the Jensen interest in uniformity.  Although states have 
historically exercised their police powers to regulate pollution16—and some 
state air pollution regulations that bear upon maritime commerce have been 
upheld17—states have generally not attempted to enforce extraterritorial 
pollution regulations against interstate and foreign nationals engaged in 
maritime commerce.  In fact, not even the federal government has chosen to 
 
 10.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  See also infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 11.  See infra notes 57–71 and accompanying text. 
 12.  See infra notes 57–71 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See infra notes 72–142. 
 14.  244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917), superseded by statute, Longshoremen’s & Harbor Worker’s 
Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 98-426, 44 Stat. 1424 (1984) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 
901–950 (2006)). 
 15.  See Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 624 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[O]ne might 
tack a sailboat into a fog bank with more confidence.”); David J. Bederman, Uniformity, Delegation 
and the Dormant Admiralty Clause, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1 (1997) (discussing broadly the history 
and limits of preemption under federal common law principles in maritime law); Ernest A. Young, 
Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273 (1999) (discussing preemption in admiralty 
generally). 
 16.  See infra note 275. 
 17.  See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960).  In 
Huron, the Court considered whether Detroit’s smoke emissions regulation interfered with the 
federal interest in the uniformity of maritime commerce regulations.  Id.  The Court compared 
compliance with the smoke abatement, applied indiscriminately to all vessels within the city, to local 
pilotage laws that must be obeyed by vessels entering local jurisdictions.  See id. at 447–48.  This 
regulation was applied to vessels only within city limits.  See generally id. at 442, 447–48. 
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enforce its own fuel content standards on foreign-flagged ships in these 
waters.18  Yet California’s VFR seek to double down on novelty: to regulate 
fuel content on vessels while they are beyond its territorial limits, and to 
enforce these regulations against both national- and foreign-flagged vessels 
engaged in international maritime commerce. 
Additionally, the twenty-four mile band of ocean water that is subject to 
the VFR is an area where the United States has already enacted its own 
pollution regulations in accordance with its international agreements.19  
California’s regulations, therefore, are now competing with federal 
legislation, international frameworks, and the federal interest in the 
uniformity of the maritime law.20  If a competing patchwork of fuel 
regulations sprouts up along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, with each state 
making its own fuel standards in competition with a federal fuel standard, it 
is arguable that federal interests in a uniform maritime law would be 
obstructed21  Under the circumstances, the VFR might thereby be preempted 
by federal maritime law principles established pursuant to the Article III 
jurisdictional grant on the basis of the competing federal statutory law.22 
This interference is not simply theoretical or hypothetical.  As many as 
fifty percent of vessels impacted by the VFR have chosen to avoid federal 
shipping lanes and navigate around California’s regulated waters.23  These 
avoidance routes take the ships through a Naval training yard, creating 
vessel traffic confusion and disrupting Naval training activities.24  The end 
result is ironically negative: a scientific analysis by CARB indicates that 
pollution levels may have actually increased as a result of the 
implementation of the VFR, because the longer avoidance routes result in 
more emissions.25 
Whether California’s regulations are preempted, and on what ground, 
are novel questions.  There is no case law directly on point to dispose of this 
question, arguably because no state has attempted to regulate this broadly 
beyond its borders with regulations bearing on such national and 
international interests.  Because the field of environmental regulation in 
maritime implicates congressionally enacted legislation, these rules may be 
preempted on a number of statutory grounds.  Namely, the CAA,26 the 
 
 18.  See infra notes 226–38 and accompanying text. 
 19.  See infra notes 123–28 and accompanying text. 
 20.  See infra Part IV. 
 21.  See infra notes 78–79, 224 and accompanying text. 
 22.  See infra notes 78–79, 224 and accompanying text. 
 23.  See infra notes 187–93 and accompanying text. 
 24.  See infra notes 187–93 and accompanying text. 
 25.  See infra notes 187–93 and accompanying text. 
 26.  See generally Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431, 7491–7492, 7501–7509a, 7511–
7515, 7521–7525, 7541–7554, 7571–7574, 7581–7590, 7601–7627, 7641–7642, 7651–7651o, 7661–
7661f, 7671–7671q (2006). 
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Submerged Lands Act (SLA),27 and the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)28 all pose potential conflicts 
with the VFR.  Additionally, the federal interest in the uniformity of 
maritime law may  provide a common law basis for preemption even where 
no statutory conflict exists. 
The VFR are currently being challenged in federal court.  The PMSA is 
seeking an injunction in federal district court, and its motion for summary 
judgment seeking this injunction was denied.29  That decision was appealed, 
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary 
judgment.30  Because the PMSA contends that the Ninth Circuit’s holdings 
as to federal law were in error, it filed a petition for writ of certiorari with 
the Supreme Court, which is pending as this Comment goes to publication.31  
Certainly, the precedential value of that case’s outcome, as well as issues 
addressed in this Comment, will have a long-term impact on the limits of 
state regulation in the field.  The extent to which states may exercise their 
police powers in ocean waters beyond their borders will be informed by this 
ongoing litigation.  This Comment takes no position on the wisdom of 
California’s environmental regulations or the science behind the policy, 
although it highlights the historical fact that California—and specifically, 
Southern California—has been confronted with a serious air pollution 
problem.32  Rather, this Comment addresses only the jurisdictional and 
preemption questions under current case precedent and shows that the VFR 
are likely preempted.33  Specifically, the regulations may be preempted by 
the CAA and MARPOL,34 and they are likely preempted by general 
principles of maritime law as espoused by the Supreme Court (the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in PMSA II notwithstanding).35  Moreover, although it is 
unlikely that the statutory framework of the SLA preempts the VFR by 
itself, the territorial boundary that the SLA codifies is a factor that strongly 
favors preemption by general maritime law principles.36 
 
 27.  Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303, 1311–1315, 1331–1356a (2006). 
 28.  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 
U.N.T.S. 61.  The MARPOL Convention was codified into United States law as the Act to Prevent 
Pollution from Ships.  33 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1915 (2006). 
 29.  See Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, No. 2:09-cv-01151-MCE-EFB, 2009 WL 
2777778 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2009) (denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment). 
 30.  Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene (PMSA II), 639 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 31.  Id., petition for cert. filed, No. 10-1555, 2011 WL 2552174 (U.S. June 23, 2011). 
 32.  See infra notes 298–300 and accompanying text. 
 33.  See infra notes 194–346 and accompanying text. 
 34.  See infra notes 199–269 and accompanying text. 
 35.  See infra notes 270–346 and accompanying text. 
 36.  See infra notes 255–77 and accompanying text. 
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Part II gives a background on Article III’s jurisdictional grant of 
maritime jurisdiction to the federal courts and the substantive federal law 
that proceeds from that grant.37  Part III provides an overview of CARB’s 
2007 regulations, which are no longer in effect, and its 2009 VFR, which are 
currently being enforced.38  Part IV discusses whether the VFR are 
preempted by congressional legislation, international legal frameworks, or 
constitutionally-derived federal maritime principles.39  Part V concludes.40 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Admiralty Jurisdiction and Substantive Maritime Law 
Article III of the United States Constitution grants the federal courts 
maritime jurisdiction.41  Specifically, Section 2 states that the “judicial 
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority . . . [and] to all Cases of admiralty and 
maritime Jurisdiction . . . .”42  The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted the district 
courts with general subject matter jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime 
cases pursuant to Article III: “The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of . . . [a]ny civil case of 
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other 
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”43  A determination as to the 
extent of this jurisdiction, and whether that jurisdiction would require the 
development of substantive common law, would be decided by the courts. 
 
 37.  See infra notes 41–142 and accompanying text. 
 38.  See infra notes 143–93 and accompanying text. 
 39.  See infra notes 194–346 and accompanying text. 
 40.  See infra notes 347–50 and accompanying text. 
 41.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  It seemed obvious to the Framers of the Constitution that disputes 
on the high seas so implicated national and international interests that the federal judiciary should be 
granted general jurisdiction in maritime.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 538 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“The most bigotted idolizers of state authority have not thus far shewn a 
disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizance of maritime causes.  These so generally 
depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within 
the considerations which are relative to the public peace.”).  Despite Hamilton’s passionate 
conviction, even admiralty jurisdiction was the subject of some debate prior to the Constitution’s 
ratification.  See JAMES WINTHROP, LETTERS OF AGRIPPA (1787), reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE 
ANTIFEDERALIST 81, 81–82 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“Pennsylvania, with one port and a large 
territory, is less favourably situated for trade than the Massachusetts, which has an extensive coast in 
proportion to its limits of jurisdiction.  Accordingly a much larger proportion of our people are 
engaged in maritime affairs.  We ought therefore to be particularly attentive to securing so great an 
interest.  It is vain to tell us that we ought to overlook local interests.”).  Nevertheless, with 
ratification, the Admiralty Clause was included in the Constitution with Hamilton’s rationale as its 
support. 
 42.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 43.  28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006). 
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In developing the jurisdictional test to determine whether a case is “of 
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction”44 the Supreme Court initially recognized 
an English common law rule that based jurisdiction on the location of the 
conduct forming the basis of the suit.45  Under the test, admiralty jurisdiction 
would be found only if the conduct sued upon occurred on the high seas or 
tidewaters.46  These waters required an ebb and flow of a tide (generally 
speaking, seawaters), with the presence of such a tide being dispositive.47  
Therefore, if the conduct sued upon occurred on these waters, the case arose 
in admiralty; but if the conduct occurred somewhere else, admiralty 
jurisdiction would not extend to the case, even if the conduct was maritime 
in nature.48 
As the country grew in size, technological advances forced changes to 
the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional test.  When the steamboat was invented, 
interstate and international commercial traffic began to be conducted on 
lakes and rivers in the interior of the country.49  Between 1814 and 1834, 
steamboat arrivals in New Orleans increased from twenty to 1200 per year.50  
Interior waters that lacked the ebb and flow of the tide or which were too far 
upstream to register one had generally not been considered to be within 
 
 44.  Id.  The words “admiralty” and “maritime” are generally defined synonymously. 
 45.  The Plymouth, 70 U.S. 20, 21 (1865), superseded in part by statute, Extension of Admiralty 
Jurisdiction Act, ch. 526, 62 Stat. 496 (1948) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30101 (2006)). 
 46.  Id.  In England, the admiralty courts were forced to compete with the courts of law for 
jurisdiction.  Id.  There, the law courts successfully restricted the reach of the admiralty courts to 
conduct occurring on waters that were affected by the ebb and flow of a tide, and only if those 
tidewaters were beyond the confines of a county.  See id. 
 47.  Id.  If a civil case arose out of conduct occurring on land, in waters that were not affected by 
a tide, or on tidewaters that were “within” a county, the case would fall within the jurisdiction of the 
common law courts, not the admiralty courts.  See id.  England’s approach would become the initial 
basis for admiralty jurisdiction in the United States, where jurisdiction would be found only if the 
conduct occurred on tidewaters.  See, e.g., Peyroux v. Howard, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324, 330, 334 (1833) 
(finding no jurisdiction where a portion of the voyage was on a river above the tidewaters and stating 
that “a man shall not sue in the admiralty only because it is a vessel” (internal citations and 
quotations omitted)); The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428, 429 (1825) 
(stating that admiralty jurisdiction extends to conduct occurring “upon the sea, or upon waters within 
the ebb and flow of the tide,” and holding that a contract to hire a seaman will sound in admiralty if 
the work is to be “substantially performed” on these waters), overruled in part by The Propeller 
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). 
 48.  See generally Peyroux, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 330.  For example, if a contract to ship goods on 
the sea was executed on land, a claim arising from its breach would not fall within the admiralty 
jurisdiction under the traditional approach.  Id. 
 49.  See generally Today in History: August 26, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/today/aug26.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). 
 50.  Id. 
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maritime jurisdiction.51  With the steamboat’s invention, these waters 
became heavily trafficked by steamboats engaged in interstate commerce.52 
In its Genesee Chief decision in 1851, the Supreme Court determined 
that such waters necessarily fell within the reach of the admiralty courts.53  
In doing so, the Court overturned its long-standing precedent defining 
maritime waters as tidewaters, extending the scope of the admiralty 
jurisdiction to all “navigable waters,” or waters that connected ports between 
states.54  Later, in Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., the 
Supreme Court added an additional constraint, holding that in order for a 
claim to sound in admiralty, it must also be connected to traditional maritime 
 
 51.  See Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the 
Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1215 (1954). 
 52.  See id. 
 53.  The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 453 (1851) (upholding a 
congressional act extending admiralty jurisdiction to the Great Lakes on the grounds that admiralty 
jurisdiction extends to all “navigable waters”).  The Great Lakes lack the ebb and flow of a tide in a 
traditional sense.  See id. at 457.  In Genesee Chief, the Court considered whether to uphold 
Congress’s extension of that jurisdiction to the lakes.  Id.  Rather than uphold Congress’s asserted 
power to extend the admiralty jurisdiction, the Court held that the Act was constitutional because the 
admiralty jurisdiction, under the Constitution, necessarily extends to all “navigable waters,” or 
waters connecting “ports and places in different states [or countries].”  See id. at 451.  In doing so, 
the Court overturned precedent requiring that the waters have a tide.  See supra note 46 and 
accompanying text; see generally Marva Jo Wyatt, Cogsa Comes Ashore . . . and More: The 
Supreme Court Makes Inroads Promoting Uniformity and Maritime Commerce in Norfolk Southern 
Railway v. Kirby, 30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 101, 111–18 (2006). 
 54.  Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 453.  In overturning long-held precedent limiting 
admiralty jurisdiction to the tidewaters, the Court in Genesee Chief reasoned that the limitation to the 
English rule was defensible in the earlier cases because at the time: 
[C]ourts of admiralty went into operation [in the United States], the definition which had 
been adopted in England was equally proper here.  In the old thirteen states the far greater 
part of the navigable waters are tide-waters.  And in the states which were at that period 
in any degree commercial, and where courts of admiralty were called on to exercise their 
jurisdiction, every public river was tide-water to the head of navigation.  And, indeed, 
until the discovery of steamboats, there could be nothing like foreign commerce upon 
waters with an unchanging current resisting the upward passage.  The courts of the 
United States, therefore, naturally adopted the English mode of defining a public river, 
and consequently the boundary of admiralty jurisdiction. 
Id. at 455.  The Court went on to say: 
[However, i]t is evident that a definition that would at this day limit public rivers in this 
country to tide-water rivers is utterly inadmissible.  We have thousands of miles of public 
navigable water, including lakes and rivers in which there is no tide.  And certainly there 
can be no reason for admiralty power over a public tide-water, which does not apply with 
equal force to any other public water used for commercial purposes and foreign trade.  
The lakes and the waters connecting them are undoubtedly public waters; and we think 
are within the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the Constitution of the 
United States. 
Id. at 457.  Not only was this the first time that the Supreme Court made significant changes to the 
constitutional scope of the admiralty jurisdiction, but by referencing the invention of steamboat 
technology, it indicated that technological advancement could have an impact on the jurisdiction of 
the admiralty courts.  See Wyatt, supra note 53, at 117 (“The Court in The Genesee Chief recognized 
that changes in technology, unforeseen at the time the Framers drafted the Constitution but which 
later fundamentally expanded maritime commerce, called for a change in that era’s view of 
admiralty jurisdiction.”). 
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activity.55  These principles have been maintained to this day as the general 
parameters of maritime jurisdiction.56 
The question of whether the admiralty court should apply state or 
federal substantive law to a particular case once jurisdiction is established is 
frequently an elusive one.57  The Judiciary Act of 1789 grants the federal 
district courts with admiralty jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty 
or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to 
which they are otherwise entitled.”58  The “saving to suitors” clause vests 
states with concurrent jurisdiction in admiralty, but the text of the clause 
itself does not appear to indicate Congress’s intent as to which substantive 
law should be applied in the case before the court—state or federal.59  The 
answer to this question has often been the subject of much debate.60  In 
1907, the Supreme Court in The Hamilton held that Congress’s power to 
make substantive maritime law stemmed from its jurisdictional grant in 
Article III, and that the states may supplement the substantive law pursuant 
to the “saving to suitors” clause in the Judiciary Act: 
The same argument that deduces the legislative power of Congress 
from the jurisdiction of the national courts, tends to establish the 
legislative power of the state where Congress has not acted.  
Accordingly, it has been held that a statute giving damages for 
 
 55.  513 U.S. 527, 527 (1995) (“[A] court first must assess the general features of the type of 
incident involved to determine if the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime 
commerce.  If so, the court must determine whether the character of the activity giving rise to the 
incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.” (internal citations and 
quotations omitted)). 
 56.  Id.; see, e.g., Connor v. Alfa Laval, Inc., Nos. 09-67099, 09-91848, 09-93726, 2011 WL 
3101810, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. July 22, 2011) (recognizing Grubart as the “modern standard”). 
 57.  See generally David P. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: “The Devil’s Own Mess,” 
1960 SUP. CT. REV. 158, 165. 
 58.  28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2006).  The “saving to suitors” clause allows suitors to seek state 
remedies in admiralty cases, where appropriate.  See infra notes 63–70. 
 59.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1) (2006). 
 60.  See Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Gilmore (The Hamilton), 207 U.S. 398 (1907) (affirming a 
district court decision that allowed state claims for loss of life that occurred during a collision on the 
high seas).  In The Hamilton, the appellant challenged the state’s authority to create substantive tort 
liability in maritime while asserting its right to a federal limitation on liability provision.  Id. at 403.  
The Court reasoned that state lawmaking authority in the field was constitutionally grounded in its 
concurrent jurisdiction in the field.  Id. at 404 (stating that to doubt a state’s power to create 
substantive maritime law “cannot be serious. The grant of admiralty jurisdiction, followed and 
construed by the judiciary act of 1789, saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law 
remedy where the common law is competent to give it, leaves open the common-law jurisdiction of 
the state courts over torts committed at sea.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
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death caused by a tort might be enforced in a state court, although 
the tort was committed at sea.61 
This principle of concurrent jurisdiction was illustrated here because the 
federal court applied substantive state law as a supplement to the federal law 
because Congress had not acted, even though the claimants had brought their 
claim in a federal district court.62 
At this early period, where state and federal law in maritime conflicted, 
deciding which substantive law to apply remained disputed.63  This issue 
was resolved in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,64 where the Supreme Court 
held that because Article III’s jurisdictional grant conferred a “national 
power”65 to determine the maritime law’s “substantive as well as its 
procedural features,”66 the Constitution required the application of federal 
law, even when maritime claims are brought in a state court or a federal 
 
 61.  Id. at 404. 
 62.  See id. at 405–07. 
 63.  In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), the Court held that the 
Constitution required federal district courts, when sitting in diversity, to apply substantive state law 
unless the matter concerned a federal question.  Id. (“Except in matters governed by the Federal 
Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.  And 
whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a 
decision is not a matter of federal concern.  There is no federal general common law.  Congress has 
no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in 
their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.”).  Unstated was 
whether the Court’s broad pronouncement that there is “no federal general common law” would be 
applied to its admiralty cases.  See id.  However, federal common law in maritime has long 
recognized some traditional maritime causes of action (e.g. “maintenance and cure,” among others) 
that predate state law and are not even recognized at common law.  See, e.g., Barnes v. Andover Co., 
L.P., 900 F.2d 630, 633 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing the maritime cause of action for maintenance and 
cure, a claim for “the living allowance for a seaman while he is . . . recovering from injury or 
illness . . . [and] payment of medical expenses incurred in treating the seaman’s injury or illness”).  
Although maintenance and cure was first recognized and defined as a federal common law maritime 
claim by the Supreme Court in The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903), the duty originated in 
European (and specifically English) tradition dating back to the medieval period.  See id. at 169.  It 
therefore seems obvious that Erie could not possibly apply in maritime cases, essentially because 
traditional maritime claims would be extinguished if substantive state law were applied.  The issue 
was directly addressed in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).  There, the defendant 
argued that, under Erie, substantive state law should be applied to his case because the district 
court’s jurisdiction was found based on diversity of citizenship.  Id. at 410–11.  If so, Pennsylvania’s 
contributory negligence standard—which was not recognized in maritime—barred the plaintiff’s 
recovery because the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent.  Id. at 409.  The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument.  Id. at 409–11.  Erie, it reasoned, was “designed to ensure that litigants with 
the same kind of case would have their rights measured by the same legal standards of liability,” 
regardless of whether a case was decided in state or federal court.  Id. at 410.  However, if the Court 
applied Erie’s principle in admiralty cases, it would be “bring[ing] about the same kind of unfairness 
[Erie] was designed to end.”  Id. at 411. Stated simply, if the Court applied Erie to maritime claims, 
the problem Erie attempted to fix would be recreated because the applicable substantive law in a 
given case would depend on whether the plaintiff claimed federal jurisdiction based on diversity or 
based on the court’s admiralty jurisdiction.  See generally id. 
 64.  346 U.S. 406 (1953). 
 65.  Id. at 409. 
 66.  Id. (quoting Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924)). 
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court sitting in diversity.67  Therefore, as a result of the jurisdictional grant, 
substantive federal maritime law is considered paramount in cases involving 
maritime matters, though not exclusive.68  This rule has since been entitled a 
“reverse Erie”69 doctrine, requiring the state courts and the district courts 
sitting in diversity to apply federal maritime law (and state law only to the 
extent it supplements it) in cases involving maritime claims.70  Therefore, 
when a matter that falls within maritime jurisdiction (such as vessel traffic 
off the coast of California) is before a state or federal court, principles of 
state law may only supplement, but not interfere with or contravene, the 
substantive federal maritime law as it is espoused and applied by the federal 
courts and Congress.71 
B.  Concurrent Legislative and Regulatory Powers 
This federal supremacy has required the courts to consider the extent of 
the preemptive effect of federal maritime law in cases where a state 
regulatory scheme attempts to supplement it.72  In a seminal case, Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, the Supreme Court held that the application of a state 
 
 67.  Id.  The Court went on to state that “[w]hile states may sometimes supplement federal 
maritime policies, a state may not deprive a person of any substantial admiralty rights as defined in 
controlling acts of Congress or by interpretative decisions of this Court.”  Id. at 409–10 (footnote 
omitted); see also supra note 63.  The reasons for granting supremacy over maritime law principles 
with the federal government are similar to those reasons for granting the federal judiciary 
jurisdiction in admiralty in the first place.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 41 (discussing 
the national interests implicated by maritime law); Joel K. Goldstein, Federal Common Law in 
Admiralty: An Introduction to the Beginning of an Exchange, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1337, 1337 
(1999) (“Most scholars and practitioners of admiralty law have long relied upon two central 
assumptions regarding their subject.  First, they have understood that uniformity was a requisite of 
maritime law such that, generally speaking, national, rather than state, law governed most maritime 
events and transactions.  Second, they have believed that in order to preserve the uniformity of 
maritime law, federal admiralty courts are empowered to fashion federal common law.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 68.  See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
 69.  See Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 626 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that 
“the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called 
‘reverse-Erie’ doctrine which requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform 
to governing federal maritime standards” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
 70.  The Supreme Court, in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 410–11 (1953), 
distinguished Erie on the grounds that Erie was designed to eliminate the unfairness of allowing the 
determination of substantive law to be based on whether a case was brought in federal or state court.  
Id.  In Erie, that unfairness was resolved by requiring the application of state law in federal diversity 
cases.  Id.  Because substantive maritime law is generally created by the federal courts and Congress, 
the Court reasoned that it would be consistent with Erie’s fairness principles to require the 
application of federal law in diversity cases involving maritime claims.  Id. 
 71.  See id. at 409–10; see also supra notes 63–70. 
 72.  See infra notes 73–80 and accompanying text. 
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worker’s compensation statute to maritime employees, who resided and 
worked in the state, was unconstitutional, even though Congress had not 
passed any competing legislation.73  The Court was confronted with the issue 
of whether New York’s Workmen’s Compensation Act could be used by the 
state to require maritime employers to compensate injured employees under 
the Act’s rules.74  The Court held that the New York law “conflicts with the 
general maritime law, which constitutes an integral part of the Federal law 
under . . . the Constitution, and to that extent is invalid.”75  Reasoning that 
because “Congress has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime 
law,” where Congress does not act, “the general maritime law, as accepted 
by the Federal courts, constitutes part of our national law, applicable to 
matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”76  The Jensen Court 
formulated a test by which to judge the constitutionality of state regulation 
in maritime: 
[N]o [state] legislation is valid if it [(1)] contravenes the essential 
purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or [(2)] works material 
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, 
or [(3)] interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that 
law in its international and interstate relations.  This limitation, at 
the least, is essential to the effective operation of the fundamental 
purposes for which such law was incorporated into our national 
laws by the Constitution itself.77 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the state’s workers’ compensation 
statute interfered with the uniformity of maritime commerce because “[i]f 
New York can subject foreign ships coming into her ports to such 
obligations . . . other states may do likewise.”78  Such a scheme would 
conceivably result in a patchwork of state regulatory regimes.  It continued: 
The necessary consequence would be destruction of the very 
uniformity in respect to maritime matters which the Constitution 
was designed to establish; and freedom of navigation between the 
states and with foreign countries would be seriously hampered and 
impeded. . . . The legislature exceeded its authority in attempting to 
 
 73.  244 U.S. 205, 217–18 (1917), superseded by statute, Longshoremen’s & Harbor Worker’s 
Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 98-426, 44 Stat. 1424 (1984) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 
901–950 (2006)). 
 74.  Id. at 207–11. 
 75.  Id. at 212. 
 76.  Id. at 215. 
 77.  Id. at 216 (emphasis added). 
 78.  Id. at 217. 
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extend the statute under consideration to conditions like those here 
disclosed.79 
New York’s Worker’s Compensation Act was thus invalidated by the 
“uniformity” prong of Jensen’s test.80 
This decision was particularly significant because the New York law did 
not conflict with an act of Congress.81  Instead, the Court relied on general 
principles of maritime law—federal common law—to hold that New York’s 
application of its worker’s compensation scheme to maritime employment 
cases was preempted.82  Although the Court was quick to note that its 
holding was not an absolute bar against supplemental state maritime 
regulation,83 Jensen stands for the principle that where state regulations 
affect maritime commerce, they have a significant preemption hurdle to 
overcome.84 
Notably, the Court stated that Jensen’s test is constitutionally required, 
and not subject to congressional manipulation.85  In fact, only the first prong 
of the Jensen test relates directly to conflicts principles vis-à-vis 
congressional legislation, but all three prongs are discussed as having 
originated in the Constitution.86  The implication, of course, is that even 
where it acts, Congress may be constrained by the limits of the Constitution 
as defined by the second and third prongs of the Jensen test.87  The Court 
held precisely this three years later in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart.88  In 
 
 79.  S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217 (1917), superseded by statute, Longshoremen’s & 
Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 98-426, 44 Stat. 1424 (1984) (codified as amended 
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (2006)). 
 80.  Id. at 217–18. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 218. 
 83.  See id. at 216 (indicating that some state regulations of maritime commerce “cannot be 
denied” validity). 
 84.  See Bederman, supra note 15, at 6 (discussing that “[t]he Court’s holding obviously 
recognized the possibility of express preemption by Congress, but the concern was plainly focussed 
[sic] on preventing states from legislating at variance with the judge-made ‘general maritime law.’”).  
Although Jensen did not venture this far, Justice Field, in a concurring opinion for a separate 
opinion, indicated a presumption in favor of complete field preemption.  See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 217  
(“‘The absence of any law of Congress on the subject is equivalent to its declaration that commerce 
in that matter shall be free.’” (quoting Bowman v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 508 (1888) 
(Field, J., concurring))). 
 85.  See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216 (“This limitation, at the least, is essential to the effective 
operation of the fundamental purposes for which such law was incorporated into our national laws 
by the Constitution itself.” (emphasis added)). 
 86.  See id. 
 87.  See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 88.  Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160 (1920).  The Court stated that 
Congress’s: 
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that case, the Court addressed Congress’s attempt to supersede the effect of 
Jensen by expressly delegating to the states the authority to enact worker’s 
compensation regulations in maritime.89  The Court invalidated this 
legislation and stated that the principles espoused in Jensen were 
constitutionally required: 
The Constitution itself adopted and established, as part of the laws 
of the United States, approved rules of the general maritime law and 
empowered Congress to legislate in respect of them and other 
matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.  Moreover, it 
took from the states all power, by legislation or judicial decision, to 
contravene the essential purposes of, or to work material injury to, 
characteristic features of such law or to interfere with its proper 
harmony and uniformity in its international and interstate relations.  
To preserve adequate harmony and appropriate uniform rules 
relating to maritime matters and bring them within control of the 
federal government was the fundamental purpose; and to such 
definite end Congress was empowered to legislate within that 
sphere.90 
To the extent the state worker’s compensation legislation conflicted with the 
Jensen test, it was preempted, even though Congress had authorized it.91 
Over the course of the decades following these decisions, the outer 
limits of the Jensen preemption test have been difficult to define.92  The 
 
[P]ower to legislate concerning rights and liabilities within the maritime jurisdiction, and 
remedies for their enforcement, arises from the Constitution . . . . The definite object of 
the grant was to commit direct control to the federal government, to relieve maritime 
commerce from unnecessary burdens and disadvantages incident to discordant 
legislation, and to establish, so far as practicable, harmonious and uniform rules 
applicable throughout every part of the Union. 
 Considering the fundamental purpose in view and the definite end for which such rules 
were accepted, we must conclude that in their characteristic features and essential 
international and interstate relations, the latter may not be repealed, amended, or changed, 
except by legislation which embodies both the will and deliberate judgment of Congress.  
The subject was intrusted to it to be dealt with according to its discretion—not for 
delegation to others. 
Id. at 164 (emphasis added). 
 89.  See id. 
 90.  Id. at 160–64. 
 91.  See id. at 166; see also Bederman, supra note 15, at 21–22 (“What followed for the majority 
in Knickerbocker . . . was that the grant of admiralty jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution 
imposed a substantive limit on Congress’s national law-making powers granted under Article I.  
Congress was invited to legislate in the maritime realm, but when a subject implicated harmony, 
Congress was obliged to legislate affirmatively and uniformly, and certainly not delegate its law-
making power to the states with the understanding that they would impose non-uniform rules.”). 
 92.  1 FRIEDELL, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 112, at 7–36 (7th ed. 1987) (“The Jensen doctrine, 
though easily stated, is not easily applied.”).  The Supreme Court long ago rejected a rigid per se rule 
that all state regulation of maritime activities is constitutionally invalid.  In Askew v. American 
Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 338 (1973), for example, a unanimous Court explained 
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application of Jensen can best be understood on a case-by-case basis, in 
piecemeal fashion.93  For example, state pilotage laws, which require 
incoming vessels to hire state-approved pilots to navigate the ship into a 
harbor or port, arguably conflict with Jensen because they directly interfere 
with the uniformity of the regulation of vessels as they enter state ports.94  
However, court decisions have upheld these laws on the ground that they 
involve uniquely local concerns and that states have historically regulated 
the practice.95  In fact, when Congress authorized state pilotage legislation 
with the Lighthouse Act in 1789, it was simply reinforcing historical state 
practice and the Court’s policy judgment that states were better equipped to 
regulate the pilotage of vessels into their own harbors and ports.96  The 
Lighthouse Act, having since been recodified without significant 
modification, remains in effect, providing that “pilots in the bays, rivers, 
harbors, and ports of the United States shall be regulated only in conformity 
with the laws of the States.”97  Despite arguments that the Lighthouse Act 
does not authorize pilotage regulations beyond a state’s territorial limits,98 
pilotage regulations have been upheld even where they extend beyond the 
state’s territorial boundary of three nautical miles from the baseline.99 
 
that Jensen and Knickerbocker have been “limited by subsequent holdings of [the] Court.”  In 
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 (1959), the Court explained that 
Jensen’s limitation on state authority “still leaves the States a wide scope.”  See also Just v. 
Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 388 (1941) (state may modify or supplement maritime law); Md. Cas. Co. 
v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 429 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting) (except in limited circumstances, “states 
are free to make laws relating to maritime affairs”). 
 93.  See generally supra note 92. 
 94.  See infra notes 258–70 and accompanying text. 
 95.  See infra notes 258–70 and accompanying text. 
 96.  46 U.S.C. § 8501(a) (2006).  The language is virtually identical to the language of the 
original 1789 legislation, which declared that “[u]ntil further provision is made by Congress, all 
pilots in bays, inlets, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States shall continue to be regulated in 
conformity with the existing laws of the States. . . .”  Lighthouse Act of 1789, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 53, 54 
(1789).  The Act remains on the books. 
 97.  See 46 U.S.C. § 8501(a) (2006). 
 98.  See Gillis v. Louisiana, 294 F.3d 755, 762 n.12 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 99.  See Wilson v. Mcnamee, 102 U.S. 572 (1880) (upholding New York’s authority to regulate 
pilots in waters extending fifty miles from its port).  More recently, two circuit court cases have 
reaffirmed the principle, although for different reasons.  See, e.g., Gillis, 294 F.3d 755 (state 
jurisdiction over pilotage not limited to state territorial waters); Warner v. Dunlap, 532 F.2d 767, 
772 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that “there is no statutory or other basis for imposing a three-mile limit 
on [pilotage] regulation”).  In each of these cases, the reviewing court was seeking to determine 
whether pilotage regulations could extend beyond the states’ legislatively granted waters under the 
SLA, and concluded that they could.  Compare Warner, 532 F.2d 767, with Gillis, 294 F.3d 755.  
Even if one were to interpret the pilotage regulations as unique because Congress had delegated the 
authority to regulate pilotage under the Lighthouse Act, a Jensen analysis is still dispositive because 
it is a constitutional requirement.  See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/14/2012  2:25 PM 
 
660 
A modern application of Jensen, in Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach 
Shellfish,100 is instructive as to how the uniformity interest has been applied 
and balanced with state interests in recent cases.101  In Ballard, the First 
Circuit stated that the application of Jensen involves balancing the federal 
interest in uniformity with the state interest in enacting the specific 
regulation.102  It noted that there is “no preemption where the relevant state 
law is procedural rather than substantive.”103  Where the state law is 
substantive, however, state and federal interests should be balanced and 
accommodated.104  It concluded that state regulation of “primary conduct”—
or, the “out-of-court behavior of ships”—would pose the “most direct risk” 
of being preempted under the uniformity test.105  Rhode Island’s 
compensation statute, which was challenged in Ballard, did not regulate the 
primary conduct of ships by creating additional forms of liability, but instead 
dealt with the amount of liability imposed on activity that was already 
unlawful.106  After narrowly construing the statute,107 the court held that, 
“providently construed,” it was not preempted.108 
Similarly, in a modern Ninth Circuit application of Jensen’s principles 
in Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry,109 the court determined that 
 
 100.  32 F.3d 623 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 101.  See infra notes 102–08 and accompanying text. 
 102.  Ballard, 32 F.3d at 628–29. 
 103.  Id. at 628 (citing Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994)). 
 104.  Id. at 628–29. 
 105.  See id. at 629 (“State regulation of primary conduct in the maritime realm is not 
automatically forbidden, but such regulation presents the most direct risk of conflict between federal 
and state commands, or of inconsistency between various state regimes to which the same vessel 
may be subject.” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)).  Although the court noted that the 
state’s interest in preventing oil pollution in its waters was weighty, and the federal interest was 
relatively less substantial because the state regulation did not govern primary conduct, the court 
ultimately did not have to conduct a full balancing test because it could point to congressional 
legislation that had just adopted the state’s position.  Id. at 629, 632.  The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
did not apply retroactively to the case, but the court reasoned that it was “compelling evidence” that 
Congress’s own balancing of the interests weighed against preemption.  Id. at 631.  See also Young, 
supra note 15, at 300 (criticizing the balancing test discussed in Ballard on the grounds that “[i]n 
most cases, . . . there will be no prior legislative weighing to which a court may defer, and the court 
will have to weigh the interests itself in the first instance. . . . [I]n close cases, a pure interest 
balancing test can provide little guidance as to the correct outcome.”). 
 106.  Ballard, 32 F.3d at 629 (emphasis added). 
 107.  In Ballard, the plaintiff sued for economic damages in response to an oil spill, and the 
defendant shipping company argued that the Supreme Court’s holding in Robins Drydock & Repair 
Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), barred liability for economic damages.  See Ballard, 32 F.3d at 
628–29.  Robins Drydock had held that liability in maritime cases for damages caused by vessels 
would not extend to suits for economic damages alone.  Robins Drydock, 275 U.S. at 309.  The 
Ballard court construed the Rhode Island statute as merely assigning additional liability (economic 
damages) for already-illegal conduct.  Ballard, 32 F.3d at 628–29.  Because the bar on economic 
damages was not a unique feature of the maritime law, the state law was therefore procedural, not 
substantive, and could be upheld because it did not regulate the primary conduct of the vessel.  See 
id. 
 108.  Ballard, 32 F.3d at 631. 
 109.  918 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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California’s interest in protecting its citizens’ overtime wages on vessels that 
spent 90% of their time moored in a California port and never traveled 
interstate was not outweighed by the federal government’s interest in 
uniformity.110  In discussing its construction of the rule, the court stated that 
its: 
[R]eview of relevant case authority leads us to conclude that the 
general rule on preemption in admiralty is that states may 
supplement federal admiralty law as applied to matters of local 
concern, so long as state law does not actually conflict with federal 
law or interfere with the uniform working of the maritime legal 
system.  The questions, then, are (1) whether applying California’s 
overtime provisions to maritime employees on the high seas 
contravenes an act of Congress, and (2) whether applying the 
provisions would unduly disrupt uniformity in maritime law.111 
In sum, because Article III’s grant of federal jurisdiction in maritime has 
provided a basis for federal substantive lawmaking supremacy in the field, 
state law will fail where it expressly or impliedly contravenes the purpose of 
congressional legislation, or if it interferes with the constitutionally-derived 
federal interest in uniformity of maritime commerce in its international and 
interstate relations.112 
C.  Concurrent Jurisdiction and International Law 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
which the United States signed but did not ratify,113 addresses the extent of a 
 
 110.  Id. at 1424–25. 
 111.  Id. at 1422. 
 112.  See generally id.; see also 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY & MAR. LAW § 4-3 (4th 
ed. 2005) (“A . . . distinctive feature of admiralty preemption is that the judge-made general 
maritime law, when in conflict with state law, is supreme.  Therefore, established rules of the general 
maritime law [as determined by the federal courts] may override state statutory and decisional law 
just as do acts of Congress.”). 
 113.  Because UNCLOS was not ratified, it does not bind the United States and “need not be 
applied or respected by state courts or legislatures unless expressly executed by a statute or order 
emanating from the federal political branches.”  Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really 
State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1840 (1998).  Although ratification has been sought by the 
President in the past, the U.S. Senate has not done so.  See id. at 1840 n.83.  Ratification has failed 
even under circumstances in 2004 where the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 
unanimously (19-0) in favor of ratification.  John A. Duff, The United States and the Law of the Sea 
Convention: Sliding Back from Accession and Ratification, 11 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 2 (2006). 
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nation’s territorial waters and just how far a state may regulate in the field.114  
Even though UNCLOS has not been ratified, for the purposes of 
jurisdictional boundaries, it has been treated as international law and relied 
upon by U.S. presidents in making offshore territorial determinations.115  
Federal Courts of Appeals have followed suit and treated UNCLOS as 
authoritative.116  The Supreme Court has also indicated a willingness to treat 
its basic principles as “customary international law.”117 
Under UNCLOS, a “State has the right to establish the breadth of its 
territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding [twelve] nautical miles, measured 
from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.”118  “The 
sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal 
waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an 
adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.”119  Even though a state’s 
 
 114.  See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea pt. II, § 2, arts. 3–16, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].  Naturally, where UNCLOS refers to “States,” it is 
generally contemplating nations, not member-states of a federal system.  Also, for terminology 
purposes, UNCLOS defines a state’s “baseline” as the “low-water line along the coast as marked on 
large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.”  See id. at pt. II, § 1, art. 5. 
 115.  In 1988, President Ronald Reagan issued an executive proclamation declaring that the 
United States’ territorial waters extended twelve nautical miles from the baseline.  Proclamation No. 
5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988).  In making this proclamation, President Reagan directly 
cited UNCLOS for support.  See id. (“[B]y the authority vested in me as President by the 
Constitution of the United States of America, and in accordance with international law, do hereby 
proclaim the extension of the territorial sea of the United States . . . [and its territories and 
possessions] . . . . The territorial sea of the United States henceforth extends to 12 nautical miles 
from the baselines of the United States determined in accordance with international law.  In 
accordance with international law, as reflected in the applicable provisions of the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, within the territorial sea of the United States, the ships of 
all countries enjoy the right of innocent passage and the ships and aircraft of all countries enjoy the 
right of transit passage through international straits.”).  Similarly, President Bill Clinton cited 
UNCLOS when recognizing the contiguous zone as extending twenty-four nautical miles from the 
baseline.  See Proclamation No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701 (Aug. 2, 1999) (“The contiguous zone of 
the United States extends to 24 nautical miles from the baselines of the United States determined in 
accordance with international law, but in no case within the territorial sea of another nation.  In 
accordance with international law, reflected in the applicable provisions of the 1982 Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, within the contiguous zone of the United States the ships and aircraft of all 
countries enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and the laying of submarine 
cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms, such 
as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft, and submarine cables and pipelines, and 
compatible with the other provisions of international law reflected in the 1982 Convention on the 
Law of the Sea.” (emphasis added)). 
 116.  Just three weeks after UNCLOS went into effect, the Ninth Circuit cited it as authority when 
defining the rights of foreign vessels to “innocent passage” in Hawaiian waters.  See Barber v. 
Hawai’i, 42 F.3d 1185, 1195–96 (9th Cir. 1994).  For a broader discussion of the circuit courts’ 
reliance on UNCLOS, see Duff, supra note 113, at 13–16. 
 117.  See United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 n.10 (1992).  In discussing the United States’ 
“international seaward boundary,” the Court cited the United States’ brief, which stated that “[t]he 
United States has not ratified [UNCLOS], but has recognized that its baseline provisions reflect 
customary international law.”  Id. (brackets in original). 
 118.  UNCLOS, supra note 114, at pt. II, § 2, art. 3. 
 119.  Id. at pt. II, § 1. 
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sovereignty extends into the territorial waters, all foreign vessels have a 
“right of innocent passage” throughout the territorial sea,120 defined as a 
right to “(a) travers[e] that sea without entering internal waters”121 or “(b) 
proceed[] to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port 
facility.”122 
Beyond the twelve-mile territorial limit, UNCLOS establishes a 
“contiguous zone,” which rests between the twelfth and twenty-fourth 
nautical mile from the baseline.123  Within this belt of water, the state’s 
territorial sovereignty is diminished.124  In this zone, UNCLOS limits the 
coastal state to “prevent[ing] infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration 
or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea . . . [and] 
punish[ing] infringement of [these] laws and regulations committed within 
its territory or territorial sea.”125 
Beyond the twenty-four mile zone, UNCLOS establishes an Exclusive 
Economic Zone, extending two hundred miles from the baseline.126  In this 
zone, the state’s sovereignty is the most diminished, as a state only retains 
“sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the natural resources” of the waters and submerged lands 
below.127  To the extent that the Outer Continental Shelf—a geographic 
underwater land mass adjacent to the coast—is located beyond two hundred 
miles, the state can, in some circumstances, extend its Exclusive Economic 
Zone rights to the edge of the shelf.128 
In the 1940s, California eyed its resource-rich coastal waters and 
claimed the first three nautical miles from the baseline as its sovereign 
territory.  The state began issuing oil exploration licenses in these waters, 
and the Supreme Court was presented with the issue of whether the state’s 
 
 120.  See id. at pt. II, § 3, art. 17. 
 121.  Internal waters, generally speaking, are waters in the interior of a state, or an enclosed bay, 
and thus treated as an equivalent of the land territory of a nation-state.  In order for a harbor or bay to 
qualify, it must meet the following definition: “If the distance between the low-water marks of the 
natural entrance points of a bay does not exceed 24 nautical miles, a closing line may be drawn 
between these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal 
waters.”  Id. at pt. II, § 2, art. 10. 
 122.  See id. at pt. II, § 3, art. 18. 
 123.  See id. at pt. II, § 4, art. 33 (“The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”). 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at pt. V, art. 57. 
 127.  Id. at pt. V, art. 56. 
 128.  See id. at pt. VI. 
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territorial claim was valid.129  California argued that, as a coastal state, it 
retained sovereignty over a three-mile belt adjacent to its coastline that it had 
possessed when it entered the Union.130  California pointed to its 1849 
constitution, which predated its admission to the United States, and that 
claimed a boundary line three miles west of its coastline.131  California 
maintained that the United States had ratified California’s territorial 
boundary as defined in its constitution by admitting it into the Union without 
requiring a change to this constitutional provision.132 
The Supreme Court disagreed.  The Court held that the boundary lines 
of coastal state members of the United States extend only to each state’s 
respective coastline.133  It rejected California’s claim to a three-mile band, 
and instead stated that “the Federal Government rather than the state has 
paramount rights in and power over that belt, an incident to which is full 
dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area, including 
oil.”134 
In response, Congress passed the SLA,135 effectively overturning the 
Supreme Court’s decision and granting coastal states a boundary line 
extension of three geographical miles beyond the coastline.136  The 
legislation delegated to coastal states the resource exploration rights that 
California had initially claimed—namely, the right to own and regulate 
resource exploration of the submerged lands under the three-mile belt of 
ocean water along its coastline.137  Through subsequent litigation, the SLA 
 
 129.  United States v. California (California I), 332 U.S. 19, 38 (1947).  California argued that it 
“own[ed] the resources of the soil under the three-mile marginal belt as an incident to those elements 
of sovereignty which it exercises in that water area.”  Id. at 29. 
 130.  See id. at 33 (addressing the history of coastal state boundaries and concluding that “a 
definite three-mile belt in which an adjacent nation can, if it chooses, exercise broad, if not complete 
dominion, has apparently at last been generally accepted throughout the world”). 
 131.  Id. at 29–30; see also CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (1849) (“The boundary of the State of 
California shall . . . [run] to the Pacific Ocean, and extend[] therein three English miles . . . .”). 
 132.  See California I, 332 U.S. at 29–30. 
 133.  See id. at 41 (holding that security and commerce interests necessitate federal dominion over 
all waters extending beyond a state’s coastline). 
 134.  Id. at 38–39. 
 135.  43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1315 (2006). 
 136.  See Aaron L. Shalowitz, Boundary Problems Raised by the Submerged Lands Act, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (1954) (noting that the purpose of the SLA was to change the law as 
laid down by the Supreme Court in California and move the territorial boundaries of coastal states to 
three geographical miles from their respective coastlines).  The Supreme Court confirmed this 
interpretation in its 1978 holding in United States v. California (California II), 436 U.S. 32, 37 
(1978) (stating that the “very purpose of the Submerged Lands Act was to undo the effect” of its 
1947 California I decision). 
 137.  See 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006).  The statute granted the coastal states the natural resources 
under these waters by declaring that: 
(1) [T]itle to and ownership of the lands beneath the navigable waters within the 
boundaries of the respective states, and the natural resources within such lands and 
waters, and (2) the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the 
said lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable State law be, and they 
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has been broadly interpreted to extend a coastal state’s territorial boundary 
itself, with dominion over the submerged lands along with the waters 
above.138  Therefore, California’s territorial boundary today is three nautical 
miles westward of its baseline.139 
The congressional grant of ownership and regulatory authority over the 
three-mile belt along state coastlines has led to controversy over whether 
certain state regulatory powers extend into and beyond this three-mile 
boundary.  Notably, states have exercised limited police powers in coastal 
waters long before Congress passed the SLA;140 but states have been barred 
from exercising other traditional state powers such as setting liability 
standards in these waters.141  Although UNCLOS allows nation-states to 
regulate in the contiguous zone for the purpose of controlling pollution,142 no 
federal court has yet held that an individual coastal state like California may 
enforce its environmental regulations in this zone against foreign-flagged 
vessels engaged in interstate and international commerce. 
 
are, subject to the provisions hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in 
and assigned to the respective States. 
Id. 
 138.  See 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (2006) (“The seaward boundary of each original coastal State is 
approved and confirmed as a line three geographical miles distant from its coast line . . . .”); 
California II, 436 U.S. at 33–34 (holding that the SLA granted “dominion over the submerged lands 
and waters within” to the state of California, against the competing claims of the United States 
(emphasis added)). 
 139.  See California II, 436 U.S. at 33–34. 
 140.  See infra notes 261–73 and accompanying text. 
 141.  See, e.g., Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 228 (1986) (holding that the 
Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) preempted Louisiana’s wrongful death statute, 
notwithstanding a DOHSA savings clause); Green v. Vermilion Corp., 144 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that general maritime law preempted Florida worker’s compensation statute); Flying Boat, 
Inc. v. Alberto, 723 So. 2d 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (same conclusion); Rand v. Hatch, 762 So. 
2d 1001 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (medical malpractice law preempted).  But see Wilburn Boat Co. 
v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) (in the absence of federal regulation governing the 
insurance warranty claim in question, state regulation may supplement the maritime law); Latman v. 
Costa Cruise Lines, 758 So. 2d 699 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (state unfair trade practice law not 
preempted as applied against cruise lines docking in Florida). 
 142.  UNCLOS, supra note 114, at pt. XII, § 5, art. 211 (stating that modern coastal states may 
establish “requirements for the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution of the marine 
environment as a condition for the entry of foreign vessels into their ports”). 
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III.  CARB ENACTS OFFSHORE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 
A.  California’s First Attempt at Emissions Regulations 
On January 1, 2007, CARB began enforcing emissions regulations that 
prohibited diesel-powered vessels143 with emission rates above certain limits 
from operating within twenty-four miles of the California baseline.144  The 
regulations specifically limited emissions of diesel particulate matter (PM), 
sulfur oxides (SOx), and nitrogen oxides (NOx).145  In addition to regulating 
these emissions, vessels entering this twenty-four mile zone, the Regulated 
California Waters (RCW),146 would be required to keep records detailing the 
type of fuel used in each engine operated within the RCW.147 
The PMSA, representing affected industry interests, contemporaneously 
filed suit and sought to enjoin California’s implementation of the 
regulations.148  The PMSA contended that the regulations were preempted on 
 
 143.  The regulation applies to “auxiliary” diesel engines, although the regulation states that it 
regards all diesel-powered vessel engines as falling under this category.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 
2299.1(d)(2) (2010) (“‘Auxiliary engine’ means an engine on an ocean-going vessel designed 
primarily to provide power for uses other than propulsion, except that all diesel-electric engines shall 
be considered ‘auxiliary diesel engines’ for purposes of this regulation.”). 
 144.  Id. § 2299.1 (titled “Emission Limits and Requirements for Auxiliary Diesel Engines and 
Diesel-Electric Engines Operated on Ocean-Going Vessels Within California Waters and 24 
Nautical Miles of the California Baseline”). 
 145.  Id. § 2299.1(e).  The emissions themselves were not directly monitored under the regulation.  
Id.  Rather, vessels were prohibited from creating emissions in excess of those that would occur if 
the vessels were using low-sulfur fuels: 
[N]o person subject to this section shall operate any auxiliary diesel engine, while the 
vessel is operating in any of the Regulated California Waters, which emits levels of diesel 
PM, NOx, or SOx in exceedance of the emission rates of those pollutants that would 
result had the engine used the following fuels: (A) Beginning January 1, 2007: 1. marine 
gas oil, as defined in subsection (d); or 2. marine diesel oil, as defined in subsection (d), 
with a sulfur content of no more than 0.5 percent by weight; (B) Beginning January 1, 
2010: marine gas oil with a sulfur content of no more than 0.1 percent by weight. 
Id.  SOx emissions would be measured by the concentration of SOx in the diesel fuel used, and no 
direct measurement would be made of the PM or NOx emitted.  See id.  These pollutant levels are 
generally dependent on the grade and level of refinement.  See Seth Mansergh, Note, Out the 
Smokestack: Retooling California’s Marine Vessel Rules for Federal Authorization, 39 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 331, 335 (2009).  Mansergh details that: 
Although there is a wide variety of grades of fuel for use in ocean-going vessels over 400 
gross tons, they are all classified according to their level of refinement.  One of the 
defining characteristics of these different grades of marine fuel is the fuel’s concentration 
of sulfur.  Generally, fuels with a higher level of refinement have a lower concentration 
of sulfur.  Highly refined distillate fuels, like marine gas oil, or marine diesel oil, contain 
the lowest concentrations of sulfur.  On the other end of the refinement spectrum, heavy 
fuel oil has relatively high concentrations of sulfur.  Correspondingly, in the middle are 
various grades of medium fuel oil. 
Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
 146.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 2299.1(b)(1) (2010). 
 147.  Id. § 2299.1(e)(2). 
 148.  See Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Cackette (Cackette), No. CIV. S-06-2791 WBS KJM, 
2007 WL 2492681 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2007) (granting summary judgment and enjoining the 
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multiple grounds,149 including by the CAA.150  The PMSA prevailed on its 
motion for summary judgment, and the district court ordered that the 
implementation of these regulations be enjoined on the ground that they 
were preempted by the CAA.151  Citing the CAA, the district court held that 
 
implementation of CARB’s emissions regulations), aff’d sub. nom. PMSA I, 517 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 
2008) (affirming on the ground that California’s offshore emissions regulations were preempted 
under the CAA). 
 149.  Id. at *3 (discussing the plaintiff’s four claims for relief: (1) preemption by the CAA; (2) 
preemption by the Submerged Lands Act; (3) preemption by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act; 
and (4) violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution).  For further discussion of each 
of these issues, see infra Part IV. 
 150.  Cackette, 2007 WL 2492681, at *3.  The CAA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671Q 
(2006).  Its modern form was first signed into law in 1970 by President Richard Nixon, who at the 
time said, “I think that 1970 will be known as the year of the beginning, in which we really began to 
move on the problems of clean air and clean water and open spaces for the future generations of 
America.”  40th Anniversary of the Clean Air Act, EPA.GOV, http://epa.gov/oar/caa/40th.html (last 
updated Jan. 21, 2012).  In 1989, President George H.W. Bush proposed amendments designed to 
further curb acid rain, urban air pollution, and toxic air emissions.  Overview—The Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990, EPA.GOV, http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caaa_overview.html (last updated Dec. 19, 
2008).  The proposals passed Congress with overwhelming bipartisan majorities in both houses and 
were signed into law in 1990.  Id. 
 151.  Cackette, 2007 WL 2492681, at *3.  The district court first reasoned that the CAA “makes 
‘the States and the Federal Government partners in the struggle against air pollution.’”  Id. at *2 
(quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990)).  However, “[u]nlike 
regulation of pollution from stationary sources, regulation of motor vehicles has been primarily a 
federal project.”  Id. (citing Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1078–79 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) 
(further citations omitted).  In fact, Congress had expressly preempted motor vehicle emissions in 
the CAA.  Id. (“No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any 
standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines 
subject to this part.  No State shall require certification, inspection, or any other approval relating to 
the control of emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condition 
precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle 
engine, or equipment.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006)).  Despite this broad preemption—
enacted to prevent a patchwork of state regulations pertaining to motor vehicle emissions—Congress 
actually granted California a specific exemption from the motor vehicle emissions preemption.  See 
Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The states acting after 
1965 were Johnnies-come-lately to the field compared to California, which had undertaken statewide 
efforts as early as 1958.  Congress’s entry into the field and the heightened state activity after 1965 
raised the spectre of an anarchic patchwork of federal and state regulatory programs, a prospect 
which threatened to create nightmares for the manufacturers.  Acting on this concern, Congress in 
1967 expressed its intent to occupy the regulatory role over emissions control to the exclusion of all 
the states all, that is, except California.”).  Accordingly, motor vehicles manufactured for use in the 
United States must comply with either California or EPA specifications.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n 
of U.S. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 526–27 (2d Cir. 1994).  The parties 
in Cackette did not dispute that ocean-going vessel emissions regulations, however, did not fall 
within the motor vehicle emissions exemption.  Cackette, 2007 WL 2492681, at *5.  Rather, they 
agreed that those vessels were governed by section 209(e) of the CAA, id., which is a catch-all 
section for nonroad engines and vehicles, see 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2) (2006) (governing all “[o]ther 
nonroad engines or vehicles”).  Unlike California’s exemption for motor vehicles, no such 
exemption was made with regard to its regulation of nonroad sources of emissions.  On the other 
hand, no express preemption was expressed by Congress, either.  Rather, section 209(e)(2) states: 
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“California cannot promulgate any ‘standards or other requirements relating 
to emissions’ for nonroad engines unless approved by the EPA.”152  Because 
it concluded the regulations were preempted by the CAA, the district court 
did not address whether the regulations were also preempted under the 
alternate grounds for relief suggested by the PMSA.153 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.154  The court agreed with the 
district court’s holding that the CAA impliedly preempted CARB’s 
regulations.155  The court also concluded that because the regulations were 
preempted under the CAA, it need not address the alternative grounds for 
relief.156  California was left to consider whether it should seek express 
 
(A) In the case of any nonroad vehicles or engines other than those referred to [above], 
the Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, authorize 
California to adopt and enforce standards and other requirements relating to the control of 
emissions from such vehicles or engines if California determines that California 
standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as 
applicable Federal standards.  No such authorization shall be granted if the Administrator 
finds that— 
 (i)   the determination of California is arbitrary and capricious, 
(ii)  California does not need such California standards to meet compelling and 
extraordinary conditions, or 
(iii) California standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are not 
consistent with this section. 
42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2) (2006).  At the time of the district court’s ruling in Cackette, only the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals had expressed an opinion as to whether section 209(e) preempted state 
regulation of nonroad engine emissions, which held that such regulations are impliedly preempted 
because they require California to seek authorization from the EPA before implementation.  See 
Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1087 (“Obviously, if no state regulation were preempted, California 
would have no need to seek authorization for its regulations . . . . Thus, the California authorization 
provision assumes the existence of a category of sources that are subject to preemption.”); but see id. 
at 1105 (Tatel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reasoning that only the regulation of 
new nonroad engines is impliedly preempted, not the regulation of used nonroad engines).  The 
district court concluded that the majority in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA had the better 
argument.  See Cackette, 2007 WL 2492681, at *6 (“This court adopts the EMA majority and finds 
that CAA § 209(e)(2) preemption covers both new and non-new nonroad vehicles and engines.  This 
court’s conclusion is bolstered by the passage of time since the EMA decision without Congressional 
action.  The D.C. Circuit decided EMA over ten years ago.  Had the EMA court incorrectly gauged 
Congressional intent, Congress has had more than enough opportunity to amend the CAA.”).  It 
therefore held that CARB’s emissions regulations as applied to ocean-going vessels were preempted 
by the CAA.  Id. 
 152.  Cackette, 2007 WL 2492681, at *6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A) (2006)). 
 153.  Id. at *3. 
 154.  PMSA I, 517 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 155.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo.  Id. at 1113.  It adopted the majority’s holding in 
Engine Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA, which held that the CAA impliedly preempts state regulations 
of nonroad engine emissions, including regulations of both new and non-new engines.  See id. at 
1114–15.  The Ninth Circuit additionally held that the regulations did not fall within the “in-use” 
requirement exception of the CAA, which allows states to create “‘carpool lanes, restrictions on car 
use in downtown areas, and programs to control extended idling of vehicles.’”  Id. at 1115 (quoting 
Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1094).  Rather, it concluded, the “plain language” of the regulations 
pertained to emissions, which were preempted.  Id. 
 156.  Id. (“Because the Clean Air Act preempts here, we, like the district court, find it unnecessary 
to decide whether the Submerged Lands Act also preempts the state rules at issue.”). 
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authorization from the EPA157 or alternatively retool the regulations to avoid 
preemption under the CAA.158  Conveniently, both the district court159 and 
the Ninth Circuit160 offered small hints as to how California might go about 
recrafting the regulations. 
B.  Retooled: California’s Current Ocean-Going Vessel Fuel Regulations 
In addition to seeking EPA authorization161 (which it is no longer 
seeking),162 CARB retooled the regulations and enacted its current VFR, 
effective July 1, 2009, requiring ocean-going vessels that call on California 
 
 157.  The Ninth Circuit had held that the regulations were preempted by the CAA without EPA 
authorization.  See id. at 1114 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2)(A)).  In May 2008, California indicated 
it was seeking EPA authorization.  See California to Discontinue Enforcement of the Ocean-Going 
Vessel Auxiliary Diesel Engine Regulation, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
AIR RESOURCES BOARD, 1 (May 7, 2008), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/ports/marinevess/ 
documents/Auxenforce050708.pdf.  At the time of this publication, authorization has not been 
received. 
 158.  California would eventually decide to attempt both simultaneously.  See generally 
Mansergh, supra note 145, at 345–50 (discussing the alternatives and arguing that CARB should 
seek EPA authorization); Harry Moren, Ninth Circuit Prevents California from Regulating Toxic 
Maritime Emissions, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 639, 644 (2008) (briefly advocating for retooled regulations 
that avoid preemption). 
 159.  See Cackette, No. CIV. S-06-2791 WBS KJM, 2007 WL 2492681, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 
2007), aff’d sub nom. PMSA I, 517 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting in dicta that “[r]egulations that 
merely govern fuel quality characteristics are permissible under CAA § 211, which allows California 
to regulate motor vehicle fuels without an EPA waiver.”) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(B) (2006))).  
However, that section expressly allows California to regulate the fuel content for motor vehicles, 
stating that any state with a motor vehicle emissions waiver (California) “may at any time prescribe 
and enforce, for the purpose of motor vehicle emission control, a control or prohibition respecting 
any fuel or fuel additive.”  42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).  Left unstated is 
whether this section also encompasses fuel regulations for nonroad engines and vehicles, such as 
ocean-going vessels.  See Cackette, 2007 WL 2492681, at *9 (taking no opinion as to the 
“applicability of this provision to nonroad sources” (emphasis in original)).  For further analysis of 
this question, see infra Part IV.A. 
 160.  See PMSA I, 517 F.3d at 1115.  Here, the Ninth Circuit discussed in dicta the possibility that 
California could regulate the fuel content of nonroad vehicles under the “in-use requirements” 
exception.  Id. (reasoning that the “EPA interprets the Clean Air Act to extend this allowance of in-
use requirements to regulations of nonroad engines.” (citing Preemption of State Regulation for 
Nonroad Engine and Vehicle Standards, 40 C.F.R. Part 85 (1994))); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7543(d) 
(2006) (“Nothing in this part shall preclude or deny to any State or political subdivision thereof the 
right otherwise to control, regulate, or restrict the use, operation, or movement of registered or 
licensed motor vehicles.”).  For further analysis of this question, see infra Part IV.A. 
 161.  See California Environmental Protection Agency News Release—Ships off California’s 
Coast Must Adhere to World’s Strictest Diesel Emission Regulation, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY AIR RESOURCES BOARD (July 24, 2008), http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/ 
nr072408b.htm. 
 162.  E-mail from Peggy Taricco, California Air Resources Board, to the author (Mar. 17, 2011, 
15:41 PST) (on file with author) (“At this time we are not seeking authorization for the Ocean-going 
Vessel Auxiliary Diesel Engine Regulation that was suspended due to a court order.”). 
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ports to use low-sulfur fuels while passing through the RCW.163  CARB 
sought to avoid preemption under the CAA by reframing the VFR as fuel 
content regulations, rather than as direct emissions caps.164  This change was 
one of style, not substance.  The two versions of these regulations have an 
identical effect: both versions cap diesel fuel sulfur content at 0.5% by 
weight, although the old version did so indirectly vis-à-vis an emissions cap, 
whereas the new version does so with a direct fuel content requirement.165  
The territorial breadth of the RCW—extending twenty-four nautical miles 
from the California baseline—remains the same.166  The current VFR list a 
number of exceptions, including an exemption for vessels that are not calling 
at a California port, as well as an exemption for vessels that are owned or 
operated by a local, state, federal, or foreign government.167 
Beginning August 1, 2012, the VFR cap the sulfur content of marine gas 
oil at 1.0% and diesel oil at 0.5%.168  On January 1, 2014, the sulfur content 
of both will be limited to 0.1%.169  The penalty for violating these fuel 
requirements is heavy, and includes fines and injunctive relief.170  Fines 
range between $45,500 and $182,000 per violation, depending on the 
number of times the vessel has been cited for a violation.171 
 
 163.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 2299.2(a) (2010) (requiring “low sulfur marine distillate fuels in 
order to reduce emissions of particulate matter . . . on ocean–going vessels within . . . [Regulated 
California Waters].”). 
 164.  Both the district court and Ninth Circuit indicated, in dicta, that fuel regulations might 
survive CAA preemption.  See supra notes 159–60. 
 165.  The new rules require all ocean-going vessels to use either marine gas oil, with a maximum 
of 1.5% sulfur content by weight, or marine diesel oil, with a maximum of 0.5% sulfur content by 
weight.  Tit. 13, § 2299.2(e)(1)(A).  Similarly, the previous version of the VFR capped emissions 
that would be generated by marine diesel oil with a 0.5% sulfur content by weight.  Id. § 
2299.1(e)(1)(A)(2).  It appears that, practically speaking, the difference is one of semantics; 
however, it is technically conceivable that, under the previous rules, compliance with the emissions 
standard could be accomplished without strictly adhering to the fuel standard, which is not possible 
with the new rules because they directly regulate fuel content.  See id. § 2299.2(e)(1)(A). 
 166.  Id. § 2299.2(b)(1).  The RCW encompass all waters within three, twelve, and twenty-four 
nautical miles of the California baseline, with a few exceptions.  Id.  Section 2299.2 states that the 
RCW encompasses waters within three nautical miles, id. § 2299.2(b)(1)(D), twelve nautical miles, 
id. § 2299.2(b)(1)(E), and twenty-four nautical miles, id. § 2299.2(b)(1)(F), of the state’s baseline.  
The former three- and twelve-mile alternatives are encompassed by the twenty-four-mile definition 
and are meaningless if it withstands scrutiny.  Id.  Indeed, the inclusion of these alternatives, when 
viewed in tandem with the section’s severability clause, id. § 2299.2(k), lends itself to the inference 
that CARB anticipated a challenge to the state’s claim of authority to regulate as far as twenty-four 
nautical miles from the baseline.  Should the twenty-four- or twelve-mile alternatives fail on grounds 
that California may not regulate beyond its own territorial waters, those definitions could be severed, 
allowing the Vessel Fuel Rules to remain in place with a more limited RCW extending three nautical 
miles from the California baseline. 
 167.  Id. § 2299.2(c)(3). 
 168.  Id. § 2299.2(e)(1)(B)(2). 
 169.  Id. § 2299.2(e)(1)(B)(3). 
 170.  Id. § 2299.2(f). 
 171.  Id. 
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C.  CARB’s Unintended Consequences 
In enacting the regulations, CARB considered, and rejected, the 
contention that the VFR would actually result in an increase in air pollution 
in Southern California.172  In contrast, the U.S. Navy had argued that, 
coupled with CARB’s proposed vessel speed reduction proposals,173 the fuel 
restriction would cause vessels to avoid long-established, federally 
designated shipping lanes that were routed through the proposed RCW, and 
would send the ships straight into the Point Mugu Sea Range.174  This traffic, 
it reasoned, would interfere with Naval training in the Sea Range and cause 
additional pollution: 
Coupl[ing] [the proposed vessel speed reductions] with the more 
expensive fuel requirements, we are concerned that this could 
influence commercial shipping to traverse the Sea Range instead of 
the Santa Barbara Channel.  Under present definitions, traversing 
the Sea Range would avoid most of the new fuel requirements as 
well as most of the area covered by the proposed speed reduction 
regulation.  Again, aside from the significant impacts to the military 
mission this would serve to increase air pollution in [Southern 
California].175 
The Navy argued that the increased traffic in the Sea Range would pose 
a hazard to its activities and create safety concerns.176  CARB rejected these 
concerns.177  It had commissioned a separate study to address the issue, and 
concluded that “we do not believe ship operators will choose to traverse 
 
 172.  Final Statement for Reasons of Rulemaking, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY AIR RESOURCES BOARD 46–47 (July 24, 2008), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/ 
2008/fuelogv08/fsor.pdf. 
 173.  The vessel speed reduction proposals have not yet been enacted by CARB.  For more 
information, see Vessel Speed Reduction for Ocean-Going Vessels, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY AIR RESOURCES BOARD, http://www.arb.ca.gov/ports/marinevess/vsr/vsr.htm 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2012). 
 174.  Final Statement for Reasons of Rulemaking, supra note 172, at 46–77. 
 175.  Id. at 46 (emphasis added).  The vessel speed reductions have not been enacted.  Only the 
fuel regulations are currently in effect.  See Vessel Speed Reduction for Ocean-Going Vessels, supra 
note 173. 
 176.  See Final Statement for Reasons of Rulemaking, supra note 172, at 46–47.  See also Leora 
Broydo Vestel, In Response to California Fuel Regulation, Cargo Ships Chart More Precarious 
Routes, GREEN: A BLOG ABOUT ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Mar. 23, 2010, 8:36 AM), 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/in-response-to-california-fuel-regulation-cargo-ships-
chart-more-precarious-routes/. 
 177.  Final Statement for Reasons of Rulemaking, supra note 172, at 46. 
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through the Point Mugu Sea Range. . . . [A]ctual changes in shipping routes 
are likely to be negligible.”178 
Notably, CARB alternatively determined that, in the event the 
regulations did cause vessels to take avoidance routes through the Sea 
Range, the emissions of nitrogen, hydrocarbons, and carbon dioxide (a 
greenhouse gas) would actually be increased.179  CARB’s study included a 
model that projected a 2–11% increase in these emissions if half of the 
impacted shipping vessels chose to traverse the avoidance routes.180  CARB 
concluded that these projected increases “constituted significant adverse 
environmental impacts from the regulation even though the impact on air 
quality and carbon dioxide levels are very small in comparison to existing 
levels and emissions.”181  Even so, CARB maintained that these adverse 
impacts created by an overall increase in emissions were outweighed by the 
local benefits—specifically, the localized reductions in particulate matter 
(PM) and sulfur oxide (SOx) pollution near the Ports of Los Angeles and 
Long Beach—and would not likely materialize because the model was based 
on “worst-case scenarios” which were “not likely to occur.”182 
Almost immediately after the regulations went into effect, CARB’s 
“worst-case scenarios” occurred.183  According to news reports, “[j]ust after 
the regulations went into effect . . . ships that normally would have 
approached the harbor along the coast, inside the Santa Barbara Channel, 
began traveling south of the Channel Islands [through the Sea Range].”184  
Officials blamed the avoidance routes on the fact that the cost savings 
associated with using an avoidance route averaged a hefty $30,000, or 
roughly one percent of the entire cost of a trans-Pacific shipment.185  
According to CARB’s own estimates, the cost to the industry of complying 
with the VFR totals $360 million annually, or $1.5 billion by 2014.186  These 
cost estimates were based on the difference in the price of fuel only, and did 
not take into consideration the additional costs that have arisen as a result of 
compliance, including reported engine and fuel-pump problems created by 
 
 178.  Id. at 46–47. 
 179.  Id. at 47. 
 180.  Id. (“Based on this analysis, ARB estimated that there could be small increases in oxides of 
nitrogen (NOx), hydrocarbons (HC) and carbon dioxide, (CO2), a greenhouse gas, if the regulation 
is implemented and causes half of the vessel traffic or all of the vessel traffic in the Santa Barbara 
Channel to take an avoidance route through the Sea Range.”). 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Vestel, supra note 176. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id.  Industry-wide, the VFR are estimated to cost $360 million annually, or about $1.5 
billion by 2014. 
 186.  PMSA II, 639 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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the use of the cleaner fuel.187  The estimated percentage of vessels choosing 
to take the avoidance route is fifty percent,188 which happens to be the same 
percentage that CARB identified as an unlikely “worst-case” scenario prior 
to the enactment of the VFR.189 
The Navy’s projections that ships taking the avoidance routes would 
interfere with Naval training activities in the Sea Range have also 
materialized: 
The Navy has also been coping with the changing traffic patterns. 
The new route has sharply increased the number of commercial 
ships traveling within the the [sic] Navy’s Point Mugu Sea Range, 
where hundreds of military exercises—including missile defense 
tests—are conducted each year, according to Tony Parisi, head of 
the sustainability office for the Naval Air Systems Command 
Ranges.  These ships “go right through the most heavily used parts 
of the range,” he said.  The Navy is working with the Marine 
Exchange to provide ships with timely information so they can 
avoid areas where tests or training are occurring. While only one 
exercise has been delayed so far by shipping traffic, the Navy 
worries that as the economy improves and traffic increases, holdups 
may become more frequent.  “If we have to cancel an event, a 
squadron may have to deploy into a war zone without the needed 
training,” Mr. Parisi said. “That’s our biggest concern.”190 
In light of these developments, it can be said that CARB’s projections were 
accurate, but only to the extent that its worst-case scenarios became 
reality.191  CARB responded to these developments by extending the reach 
of the RCW an additional twenty-four miles from the Channel Islands, 
which are located off the coast of Southern California, in hopes of 
encompassing the avoidance routes with a 48-mile regulated area in the 
Southern portion of the state.192  CARB officials assert that the change might 
encourage the shippers to switch back to the traditional shipping routes, 
 
 187.  ARB Eyes Expanded Clean-Fuel Rule to Crack Down on Shippers, INSIDE WASH. 
PUBLISHERS (Oct. 1, 2010), http://environmentalnewsstand.com/Inside-Cal/EPA/Inside-Cal/EPA-
10/01/2010/menu-id-305.html. 
 188.  Vestel, supra note 176. 
 189.  See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 190.  Vestel, supra note 176. 
 191.  See supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text. 
 192.  See Leora Broydo Vestel, California Widens Clean-Fuel Zone for Ships, GREEN: A BLOG 
ABOUT ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT (June 24, 2011, 10:53 AM), 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/california-widens-clean-fuel-zone-for-ships/. 
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although at least some shippers have stated that it will result in the creation 
of additional avoidance routes.193 
IV.  WHETHER CALIFORNIA’S VESSEL FUEL RULES ARE PREEMPTED 
Federal preemption of state regulation is grounded in the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution, which states that the Constitution, 
treaties, and laws of the United States are the “supreme Law[s] of the 
Land.”194  Although a thorough discussion of this principle would be well 
beyond the scope of this Comment, a state law will generally fail a 
preemption test if federal law is intended to preempt the state’s action or is 
otherwise in conflict, demonstrated by a number of factors.195  Therefore, 
although California’s VFR were retooled to avoid preemption under the 
CAA, those efforts do not necessarily shield the VFR from other alleged 
grounds for preemption.196  This section focuses on the issue of whether 
CARB’s current regulations should withstand a preemption challenge.197  
Because CARB’s previous 2007 regulations were enjoined in PMSA I when 
 
 193.  ARB Eyes Expanded Clean-Fuel Rule to Crack Down on Shippers, supra note 187. 
 194.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”); see also SCHOENBAUM, supra note 112, at § 4-3 (“The principles of preemption 
to resolve conflicts between federal and state law rest upon the authority of Article VI of the U.S. 
Constitution, which declares federal law to be the supreme law of the land.”). 
 195.  See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra note 112, at § 4-3 n.1.  Federal law will preempt state 
law under four general circumstances: (1) express preemption, (2) implied preemption, (3) conflict 
preemption, and (4) field preemption.  Id.  Express preemption is shown where Congress “explicitly 
state[s]” that state regulation on the subject is preempted.  Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 
525 (1977).  Preemption is not express, but implied, where the intent to preempt is inferred from the 
“structure and purpose” of the law enacted.  Id.  State law may also be preempted where it otherwise 
conflicts with federal law, such that compliance with both state and federal law would be a “physical 
impossibility.”  See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963).  Finally, 
field preemption is shown where: 
[S]tate law . . . regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal 
Government to occupy exclusively.  Such an intent may be inferred from a “scheme of 
federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left 
no room for the States to supplement it,” or where an Act of Congress “touch[es] a field 
in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to 
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” 
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218, 230 (1947)).  Preemption principles are sometimes approached uniquely in maritime commerce 
because, in addition to the possibility for congressional legislation in the field, the federal courts 
have developed a federal common law in maritime that itself may preempt state law.  See supra 
notes 73–112 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part IV.D regarding the applicability 
of maritime preemption principles to the instant regulation. 
 196.  As discussed above, because the emissions regulations were held to be impliedly preempted 
under the CAA, the Ninth Circuit did not address whether the PMSA’s alternative preemption claims 
were meritorious.  See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 197.  On the other hand, the policy question—whether the Vessel Fuel Rules are advisable, or, 
alternatively, should be repealed—is well beyond the scope of this Comment. 
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the Ninth Circuit held that they were preempted by the CAA, it makes sense 
to begin by addressing the issue of whether the CAA preempts the current 
VFR.198 
A.  Whether the Clean Air Act Preempts the Vessel Fuel Rules 
The key distinction between the rules enacted in 2007 and the current 
VFR that were enacted in 2009 is that the former directly regulated vessel 
emissions,199 whereas the latter directly regulate fuel content200 (with the 
stated purpose of reducing emissions).201  This difference is significant 
because the Ninth Circuit in PMSA I actually indicated that the difference 
between the regulation of fuel content, as opposed to emissions, was “[t]he 
key issue [of the] case.”202  There, the court held that the CAA preempted 
the emissions regulations, but added, in dicta, that the VFR would not have 
been preempted by the CAA if they had been enacted as fuel content 
regulations.203  Although California attempted to frame the VFR as “in-use 
requirements,” which indirectly regulated fuel content, the court found that 
the regulations were plainly emissions standards and therefore were 
 
 198.  See infra notes 199–220 and accompanying text. 
 199.  See supra notes 144–47. 
 200.  See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 201.  The stated purpose of the Vessel Fuel Rules is to “reduce emissions” from ocean-going 
vessels.  See Final Statement for Reasons of Rulemaking, supra note 172, at 1 (“In this rulemaking, 
the Air Resources Board . . . is adopting a new regulation and an airborne toxic control measure . . . 
to reduce emissions of diesel particulate matter (PM), nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur oxides (SOx), 
and ‘secondarily’ formed PM (PM formed in the atmosphere from NOx and SOx) from main and 
auxiliary diesel engines, and auxiliary boilers, operated on ocean-going vessels within 24 nautical 
miles of the California baseline . . . .” (emphasis added)).  The current fuel regulations are thus an 
indirect way of enacting what California was enjoined from enacting directly.  As shown above, the 
only practical difference between the two versions of the regulations is that the 2007 rules cap 
emissions according to a fuel content standard, whereas the 2009 rules omit the stated purpose from 
the text and enact effectively identical fuel content standards as content requirements (requiring 
0.5% sulfur content by weight for marine diesel oil).  See supra note 165.  This raises its own 
question: May California act indirectly where it may not directly?  Perhaps yes, although this is not 
decided.  See infra notes 205–20 (discussing the potential applicability of the CAA’s “in-use 
requirements” authorization to ocean-going vessels). 
 202.  PMSA I, 517 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The key issue in this case is whether the 
Marine Vessel Rules constitute ‘standards . . . relating to the control of emissions from [] vehicles or 
engines,’ and thus are preempted, or whether the VFR are mere ‘in-use requirements’ under § 209(d) 
that are not preempted.  We hold that they are standards.” (brackets in original)). 
 203.  See id. at 1115 (“Even if vessel operators may comply with the Marine Vessel Rules by fuel 
switching, the emission limits set by the Marine Vessel Rules are analyzed separately from these 
means of compliance.”). 
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preempted.204  Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit added that, had the regulations 
been enacted as direct restrictions of fuel content, they would have passed 
muster under section 209(d) of the CAA (regarding “in-use requirements”), 
stating that the section applies to nonroad engines and vehicles.205  In its 
discussion, the court relied on the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Engine 
Manufacturers Ass’n v. EPA, which held that the in-use requirements 
exception applied to nonroad engines.206  If ocean-going vessel engines are 
nonroad engines under this section, then California is legislatively 
authorized to make in-use requirements for ocean-going vessels under the 
CAA.207 
On further study, however, the application of section 209(d) to ocean-
going vessels in this context is not so clearly in accordance with Congress’s 
intent.208  Section 209(d) of the CAA, which authorizes states to make “in-
use requirements,” expressly applies to motor vehicles only.209  Only by 
inference is that section applied to nonroad engines and vehicles.210  
Moreover, the EPA and the court in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n did not 
appear to contemplate ocean-going vessels when they applied the section to 
nonroad engines.211  Indeed, in extending the section’s application to such 
 
 204.  Id.; see also supra note 165 and accompanying text (the difference is largely one of 
semantics, although it may be conceivable to comply without using the low-sulfur fuel, however 
unlikely).  The Ninth Circuit reasoned: 
[California argues that] the Marine Vessel Rules are a permissible in-use requirement 
because the Rules regulate the sulfur content of the fuel used by ocean-going vessels.  
However, the plain language of the Rules regulates emissions, not fuel.  The Marine 
Vessel Rules create a limit on emissions (i.e. emissions must not be greater than what 
would be emitted using the specified fuels) that is presumed to be met if the specified 
fuels are used.  Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13 § 2299.1(e).  Supplying a presumed mode of 
compliance does not alter the nature of the general requirement limiting emissions. 
Indeed, the Marine Vessel Rules do not impose an in-use fuel requirement because no 
particular fuel is required to be used at all. 
PMSA I, 517 F.3d at 1115.  Of course, the alternative—rules that directly require a particular fuel—
was not at issue in this case.  However, the dicta indicates a positive result under the CAA. 
 205.  See PMSA I, 517 F.3d at 1115 (citing Air Pollution Control, 59 Fed. Reg. 36,969, 36,973–74 
(July 20, 1994) (“It should be noted that section 209(e)(2) of the Act does not prevent California or 
other states from regulating nonroad engines and vehicles in use.”)). 
 206.  Id. (citing Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 
 207.  See supra note 160; see also Clay J. Garside, Comment, Forcing the American People to 
Take the Hard NOx: The Failure to Regulate Foreign Vessels Under the Clean Air Act As Abuse of 
Discretion, 79 TUL. L. REV. 779, 789–90 (2005) (“The relevant Clean Air Act provisions [applicable 
to ocean-going vessels] are found in section 213 entitled ‘Nonroad engines and vehicles.’  That 
Congress contemplated the EPA’s authority to regulate nonroad engines and vehicles to include 
regulation of marine vessels generally is apparent from the statutory history of the Clean Air Act and 
the fact that the EPA has always interpreted its authority to include marine vessels.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 208.  See infra notes 209–20 and accompanying text. 
 209.  42 U.S.C. § 7543(d) (2006) (“Nothing in this part shall preclude or deny to any State or 
political subdivision thereof the right otherwise to control, regulate, or restrict the use, operation, or 
movement of registered or licensed motor vehicles.” (emphasis added)). 
 210.  See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 211.  The EPA defines nonroad engines as follows: 
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engines, these authorities contemplated that section 209(d) would be applied 
to tractors and lawnmowers—not ocean-going vessels.212  In explaining why 
section 209(d) was applicable to nonroad engines, the EPA reasoned that 
nonroad engines such as lawnmowers are “location-specific” and “primarily 
effect local users” only.213  Indeed, a state’s interest in regulating the use of 
 
[A] nonroad engine is any internal combustion engine: 
(i)   in or on a piece of equipment that is self-propelled or serves a dual purpose by 
both propelling itself and performing another function (such as garden tractors, off-
highway mobile cranes and bulldozers); or 
(ii)  in or on a piece of equipment that is intended to be propelled while performing 
its function (such as lawnmowers and string trimmers); or 
(iii) that, by itself or in or on a piece of equipment, is portable or transportable, 
meaning designed to be and capable of being carried or moved from one location to 
another. Indicia of transportability include, but are not limited to, wheels, skids, 
carrying handles, dolly, trailer, or platform. 
Air Pollution Control, 59 Fed. Reg. at 36,971.  The definition does not mention engines on ocean-
going vessels.  See id.  Indeed, the word “vessel” does not appear anywhere in this section of the 
EPA’s interpretation of nonroad engine regulations.  See id.  Likewise, Engine Manufacturers Ass’n 
contemplated similar types of nonroad engines when it held that the in-use exception applies to such 
nonroad engines.  See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Nonroad 
engines are internal combustion engines that are used in a wide variety of off-highway equipment 
including lawnmowers, bulldozers, and locomotives.”); see also id. at 1103 (including “locomotives 
and small construction and farm equipment”). 
 212.  The EPA discusses “the location-specific nature of in-use regulations” and reasons that: 
In-use regulations, such as time of use or place of use restrictions (e.g. high occupancy 
vehicle lanes) are typically very site specific.  An in-use regulation suitable for 
California, or in part of California, may have little or no relevance or practicality to the 
type of in-use regulation suitable for another area.  Such regulations which primarily 
effect local users are more appropriately controlled and implemented by local and state 
governments. 
Air Pollution Control, 59 Fed. Reg. 36,969-01, 36,974.  This rationale simply does not extend to the 
type of nonroad engines contemplated by the VFR, as they regulate vessel conduct on the high seas, 
outside the state of California, and bearing upon international maritime commerce.  See supra notes 
161–71 and accompanying text.  In fact, the majority in Engine Manufacturers Ass’n explained that 
the rationale supporting in-use requirements was based on the local, “‘intra-state’” effect of the 
regulations.  See Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1083 (“The preemption sections, however, do not 
preclude a state or locality from imposing its own exhaust emission control standards upon the resale 
or reregistration of the automobile.  Nor do they preclude a locality from setting its own standards 
for the licensing of vehicles for commercial use within that locality.  Such regulations would cause 
only minimal interference with interstate commerce, since they would be directed primarily to 
intrastate activities and the burden of compliance would be on individual owners and not on 
manufacturers or distributors.”).  Engine Manufacturers Ass’n, moreover, was not a maritime case, 
and the majority also used a balancing approach used to address these preemption issues under the 
CAA.  See id. at 1089 n.42 (“Here . . . the court is dealing with a provision that balances various 
competing interests—for example, the policy of locally appropriate regulation as against 
manufacturers’ economic interest in uniform regulation—so it is impossible to say that the literal 
text ‘frustrates’ the purpose of § 209(e).”).  An in-use regulation that bears upon maritime 
commerce—which carries a weighty interest in uniformity—beyond the borders of the state, as the 
Vessel Fuel Rules do, might therefore fail under an application of this balancing test referenced by 
Engine Manufacturers Ass’n.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 213.  See supra note 212. 
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lawnmowers is heightened because such vehicles are not involved in 
interstate transportation.214  However, it stretches the imagination to contend 
that the “in-use requirements” section that Congress first intended in order to 
allow states to create carpool lanes215 for “registered or licensed motor 
vehicles,”216 and which has since been held to include nonroad engines like 
lawnmowers, could, by subsequent inference, also authorize the regulation 
of foreign-flagged vessels engaged in international trade in the contiguous 
zone.  Nevertheless, it appears that the Ninth Circuit’s dicta went 
unchallenged in PMSA II because the court did not address it, and the PMSA 
did not raise the issue of CAA preemption.217 
Moreover, even if the Ninth Circuit’s dicta that the CAA authorizes the 
VFR should stand, the preemption analysis does not end there.218  In a 
maritime context, even if Congress has delegated a specific regulatory 
authority to the states, the delegation may itself be unconstitutional where 
the regulatory power bears upon maritime commerce.219  The VFR, 
therefore, must survive a maritime law preemption analysis, even if 
Congress has delegated its powers to the states.220 
B.  MARPOL Annex VI: An International Framework 
The United States has also enacted vessel fuel content regulations 
through an international framework, MARPOL.221  MARPOL was ratified 
by the United States in 2008.222  The relevant portion of MARPOL, Annex 
VI, caps the sulfur content in fuel oil used by ocean-going vessels at 4.5%, 
with a 1.5% limit in some special control areas.223  As discussed in Part 
IV.D, this may be an assertion of a federal interest in less stringent and 
 
 214.  See supra note 212. 
 215.  Carpool lanes for motor vehicles are a specific type of regulation contemplated by the EPA 
when interpreting section 209(d).  See Air Pollution Control, 59 Fed. Reg. at 36,974 (referencing 
high-occupancy vehicle lanes as the type of regulation authorized by section 209(d)).  Such an 
interpretation is consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s definition of this allowance.  See Engine Mfrs. 
Ass’n, 88 F.3d at 1094 (“[T]he longstanding scheme of motor vehicle emissions control has always 
permitted the states to adopt in-use regulations—such as carpool lanes, restrictions on car use in 
downtown areas, and programs to control extended idling of vehicles—that are expressly intended to 
control emissions.”). 
 216.  42 U.S.C. § 7543(d) (2006). 
 217.  See Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, No. 2:09-cv-01151-MCE-EFB, 2009 WL 
2777778 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2009), aff’d, PMSA I, 517 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2008).  The PMSA does 
not raise the issue of CAA preemption in its complaint seeking an injunction preventing the  
implementation of the 2009 Vessel Fuel Rules. 
 218.  See infra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 219.  See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text. 
 220.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 221.  See infra notes 223–54 and accompanying text. 
 222.  See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, supra note 28; see 
also Moren, supra note 158, at 643. 
 223.  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, supra note 28. 
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uniform fuel content regulations that should factor into a preemption 
analysis under Jensen.224  Additionally, Annex VI of MARPOL, which also 
was ratified by the United States in 2008,225 raises additional questions of 
preemption under the framework itself. 
The United States entered MARPOL to discourage a patchwork of 
international regulation that would put the United States at a competitive 
trade disadvantage.226  After its entrance into MARPOL, the EPA was tasked 
with developing, promulgating, and enforcing fuel standards for ocean-going 
vessels that were consistent with Annex VI.227  Because MARPOL is an 
international treaty that must be ratified by other nations before it is binding 
on them, the EPA has been hesitant to enforce MARPOL’s fuel 
requirements against foreign-flagged vessels, including those vessels that 
call on American ports.228  Currently, the EPA enforces Annex VI only 
against American-flagged vessels.229  The EPA’s decision not to enforce 
Annex VI against foreign vessels is worth noting here because California has 
claimed the power to regulate in a field where even the federal government 
has recognized limits to its authority.230  In fact, CARB referenced the fact 
that the EPA does not enforce the Annex VI regulations against foreign-
flagged vessels in support of its decision to enact its own Rules—a tacit 
 
 224.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 225.  Moren, supra note 158, at 643. 
 226.  See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text; see also C. Jonathan Benner, State Clean Air 
Regulation Takes A Long Sea Voyage, 21 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 27, 30 (2006) (“While there is 
no question that the United States has authority to regulate air emissions on its national-flag vessels, 
differential, domestic-only regulation of the relatively small U.S.-flag fleet would have placed that 
domestic industry at a cost and competitive disadvantage with other nations while having relatively 
little impact on the global problem of marine emissions.”). 
 227.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1903 (2006); Control of Emissions From New Marine Compression-Ignition 
Engines at or Above 30 Liters Per Cylinder, 68 Fed. Reg. 9746-01 (Feb. 28, 2003) (promulgating 
“emission standards for new marine diesel engines installed on vessels flagged or registered in the 
United States . . . . These standards are equivalent to the internationally negotiated standards for 
oxides of nitrogen and will be enforceable under U.S. law for new engines built on or after January 
1, 2004”). 
 228.  See Control of Emissions From New Marine Compression-Ignition Engines at or Above 30 
Liters Per Cylinder, 68 Fed. Reg. 9746-01 (applying marine diesel engine standards to U.S.-flagged 
vessels only); see also Benner, supra note 226, at 30–31 (“Although EPA has consistently declined 
to apply domestic U.S. emissions standards to engines in non-U.S. vessels that are only temporarily 
within the United States as part of the passenger or cargo operations, the question of EPA’s authority 
and jurisdiction to impose standards on foreign vessels remains in dispute . . . .”). 
 229.  See Control of Emissions From New Marine Compression-Ignition Engines at or Above 30 
Liters Per Cylinder, 68 Fed. Reg. 9746-01 (Feb. 28, 2003) (applying fuel requirement standards to 
“vessels flagged or registered in the United States”). 
 230.  See Benner, supra note 226, at 28 (“California’s proposed regulations unilaterally construct 
a jurisdictional framework that arguably exceeds even the powers of the federal government to 
regulate air emissions from non-U.S.—flag ships.”). 
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admission by CARB that it knew it was regulating in an area where even the 
federal government had acknowledged its powers were limited.231 
In determining whether Annex VI preempts the VFR, the Ninth Circuit 
panel in PMSA II noted that the statute contains a savings clause, which 
states that the requirements of Annex VI “supplement,” but do not amend, 
any other authorities.232  It appears that because the savings clause is framed 
in broad terms, the panel assumed that the clause speaks for itself on the 
matter (it did not further explain why the California regulations would be 
encompassed by the clause, nor did it cite to any additional authority in 
support of this interpretation).233  And because of the novelty of California’s 
regulations, there is no case precedent interpreting the savings clause in this 
context.  True, the language of the savings clause is broad.234  However, in 
Offshore Logistics Inc. v. Tallentire,235 the Supreme Court held that the 
federal Death on the High Seas Act preempted Louisiana’s wrongful death 
statute even though the law included a comparable savings clausebecause 
general principles of maritime law required preemption.236  Additionally, 
there is an apparent conflict between California’s law and the core purpose 
of Annex VI.  Annex VI was designed to establish an international 
framework that would prevent the development of a patchwork of fuel 
regulations among member countries237 and may be undermined where a 
state or province within a member country enacts the very patchwork that 
membership was intended to preclude.238 
 
 231.  Mansergh, supra note 145, at 336–37 (“[W]hen CARB evaluated the EPA’s emission 
standards for ocean-going vessels, it concluded that they were too limited in their application.  
CARB wanted its version of the Marine Vessel Rules to cover auxiliary engines from both U.S. and 
non-U.S.-flagged vessels, and it wanted them to take effect immediately without having to wait for 
new engines to be built in compliance.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 232.  PMSA II, 639 F.3d 1154, 1180 (9th Cir. 2011) (“MARPOL contains an express savings 
clause.” (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1911 (2006) (“Authorities, requirements, and remedies of this chapter 
supplement and neither amend nor repeal any other authorities, requirements, or remedies conferred 
by any other provision of law. Nothing in this chapter shall limit, deny, amend, modify, or repeal any 
other authority, requirement, or remedy available to the United States, or any person, except as 
expressly provided in this chapter.”)). 
 233.  Id. at 1181. 
 234.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1911 (2006) (“Authorities, requirements, and remedies of this chapter 
supplement and neither amend nor repeal any other authorities, requirements, or remedies conferred 
by any other provision of law.” (emphasis added)).  State law—and its own requirements and 
remedies—seems to be excepted with this language. 
 235.  477 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 236.  In Tallentire, the Supreme Court held that DOHSA preempted Louisiana’s wrongful death 
statute, notwithstanding a DOHSA savings clause that provided that “[t]he provisions of any State 
statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected” by DOHSA.  
Id. at 211.  The Court cited Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen for the proposition that “‘[n]o [state] 
legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress.’”  Id. at 
228 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917)); see also Askew v. Am. Waterways 
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 344 (1973) (acknowledging that Jensen “has vitality left”). 
 237.  See supra note 226. 
 238.  See supra note 226. 
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This outcome carries potential international risks.  It is not 
inconceivable that California’s precedent here might encourage local 
governments in other member countries to enact their own regulations, 
further harming the U.S. interest in uniformity that was the basis for its 
Annex IV membership.239  The Alaska Supreme Court contemplated this 
possibility in Alaska v. Bundrant.240  Alaska had enacted regulations limiting 
shellfish fishing in an area it called the “Bering Sea Shellfish Area,” which 
stretched as far as sixty miles off the Alaskan coast.241  The law did not 
specify whether the regulations applied to foreign-flagged fishing vessels, 
and it was therefore conceivable that the state would apply its regulations to 
all fishing vessels in the Bering Sea Shellfish Area.242  In holding that the 
regulations were not preempted, the Bundrant court narrowly construed the 
state’s regulations as enforceable against United States fisherman only, 
reasoning that: 
[T]here is a potential for conflict with United States agreements 
with foreign nations concerning fishing practices on the high seas, 
for example the Soviet Bilateral agreements with the United 
States . . . . Enforcement of the Alaskan regulations against foreign 
nationals could be taken as . . . a unilateral step by the United 
States, inviting reciprocal moves by other nations.  The state’s 
response is that these regulations, being aimed at United States 
fishermen, will not be enforced against foreign nationals. . . . 
Indeed, to the extent these regulations are inconsistent with fishing 
rights granted to foreign nations pursuant to the treaty power, the 
Supremacy Clause dictates that they must yield.243 
The Alaskan court’s narrow construction of its fishing regulation is 
instructive because it represents the recognition that the federal interest in 
uniformity is weightier where a state’s regulation tinkers with a pre-existing 
international framework.244  The VFR raise similar concerns where, as in 
Bundrant, the United States has entered an international agreement.245 
This issue has been complicated further because a separate, bilateral 
agreement was recently negotiated between the United States and Canadian 
 
 239.  See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 240.  546 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976). 
 241.  Id. at 533, 558. 
 242.  See id. at 540. 
 243.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 244.  See id. 
 245.  See supra text accompanying note 221. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/14/2012  2:25 PM 
 
682 
governments creating an “Emission Control Area” (ECA) pursuant to Annex 
VI.246  These new emission standards will regulate the fuel used by all 
vessels—including vessels flagged in non-member countries—which 
operate an area of the ocean extending approximately two-hundred miles 
from the U.S. and Canadian baselines.247  They will begin to go into effect in 
August 2012,248 and will present an additional layer of potential conflict.249 
California has argued that MARPOL, and the pending implementation 
of the bilateral ECA, should not preempt its regulations because the state 
will likely invoke a sunset clause250 and stop enforcing its regulations once 
the ECA goes into effect.251  This argument was referenced by the Ninth 
Circuit in its own analysis of MARPOL preemption, stating that it is 
“reasonable to predict” that the VFR will sunset when the ECA takes 
effect.252  However, California’s argument here cuts both ways: it can be 
summarized as a contention that the VFR are not preempted because they 
will likely be terminated soon—a tacit admission that the VFR stand on 
precarious ground as currently enacted and enforced.  And the sunset clause 
does not address the question of whether the VFR are preempted today or at 
any time before they are actually sunsetted—either under Annex VI as it 
currently stands or when the ECA is implemented. 
More to the point, whether the sunset clause will actually be invoked to 
terminate the VFR at this later date is a separate question.  The VFR state 
that they will sunset when CARB’s Executive Officer determines the United 
 
 246.  Susan B. Geiger, Barry M. Hartman, Mark Ruge & Yvette T. Wissmann, International 
Maritime Organization (“IMO”) Approves Authority for U.S. to Impose Stringent New Air Emission 
Standards for Large Oceangoing Vessels, K&L GATES (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.klgates.com/ 
international-maritime-organization-imo-approves-authority-for-us-to-impose-stringent-new-air-
emission-standards-for-large-oceangoing-vessels-04-06-2010/.  The ECA extends two-hundred 
miles from the U.S. and Canadian baseline. 
 247.  Id.  From August 2012 to 2015, the standards will cap fuel sulfur content at 1.0% by weight; 
and beginning in 2015, the standard will be 0.1% by weight.  Ocean Vessels and Large Ships, 
EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/oms/oceanvessels.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2012). 
 248.  Ocean Vessels and Large Ships, supra note 247. 
 249.  The caps that were set by the United States and Canada during these negotiations likely took 
into consideration a number of factors—including the interest in the movement of foreign-flagged 
vessels in commerce off the coasts of America and Canada—in addition to pollution concerns.  If 
individual states pass their own, more-stringent or otherwise different standards, they could 
undermine promises and obligations made by the United States during these negotiations and set in 
motion reciprocal moves by other countries with obligations on which the United States relies.  This 
possibility was addressed in Bundrant, a comparable context, where the Supreme Court of Alaska 
held that its state’s fishing regulations were preempted if applied to foreign vessels.  See supra notes 
240–44 and accompanying text. 
 250.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 2299.2(j)(1) (2010) (“The requirements specified in subsection 
(e) [establishing limits on sulfur content in vessel fuel] shall cease to apply if the United States 
adopts and enforces requirements that will achieve emissions reductions within the Regulated 
California Waters that are equivalent to those achieved by this section.”). 
 251.  Brief for Appellee at 48, PMSA II, 639 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-17765). 
 252.  PMSA II, 639 F.3d at 1180 (“The Vessel Fuel Rules also contain a sunset clause, and it is 
reasonable to predict that, once the heightened standards established by the ECA go into effect, the 
Vessel Fuel Rules will be terminated.”). 
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States has adopted “equivalent” regulations so that the California regulations 
are no longer needed.253  This clause therefore places the authority to make 
the determination with the state.  CARB could just as conceivably determine 
that the EPA has not acted sufficiently, a plausible outcome here because the 
ECA regulations will not be anywhere near as stringent as the California 
Rules will be when they are first implemented.254  The sunset clause also 
might fail to be invoked if California later decides to require even more 
stringent or qualitatively different standards, setting up additional conflicts 
with MARPOL.  Therefore, reliance on California’s predictions about 
whether CARB’s Executive Officer will one day make a determination to 
sunset the VFR in the future is ridden with pitfalls.  And as discussed infra 
Part IV.D, MARPOL’s international framework also weighs heavily as a 
factor favoring a finding of preemption given that it shows a strong federal 
interest in the uniformity of maritime law. 
C.  The Submerged Lands Act and Extraterritorial Concerns 
In litigation over both the 2007 and 2009 versions of CARB’s 
regulations, the PMSA also argued that the SLA—setting California’s 
territorial limits at three miles from the baseline—preempted CARB’s 
regulations to the extent that they extend beyond this boundary.255  The 
Ninth Circuit never considered this question in PMSA I because it held that 
the regulations were preempted under the CAA, and did not reach this 
question.256  However, in PMSA II, the Ninth Circuit held that the SLA did 
not preempt the VFR, basing its holding primarily on case precedent 
 
 253.  Tit. 13, § 2299.2(j)(1) (“Equivalent requirements may be from IMO regulations that are 
adopted and enforced by the United States or may be contained in regulations that are initiated by 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.  Subsection (e) shall remain in effect under this 
subsection until the Executive Officer issues written findings that federal requirements are in place 
that will achieve equivalent emissions reductions within the Regulated California Waters and are 
being enforced within the Regulated California Waters.”). 
 254.  Even when the ECA goes into effect, its requirements will allow ten times the sulfur content 
in vessel fuel as compared with the California rules.  As of August 2012, the date that these rules are 
proposed to take effect, California will limit sulfur content to 0.5% of vessel diesel oil by weight, see 
supra note 168, whereas the ECA standards will allow 1.0% sulfur by weight, see supra note 247, a 
twofold difference.  This means that the EPA will allow significantly more sulfur content in vessel 
diesel oil, a disparity that CARB very well may decide is not sufficiently “equivalent” to sunset the 
Rules.  As additional evidence that CARB is not planning to leave the field anytime soon, it is 
currently considering proposed amendments to the Rules that would extend their reach.  See supra 
note 192 and accompanying text. 
 255.  See PMSA I, 517 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2008); Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, No. 
2:09-cv-01151-MCE-EFB, 2009 WL 2777778 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2009). 
 256.  See supra note 156. 
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upholding other forms of extraterritorial regulations, like pilotage 
regulations.257 
The authority for states to make pilotage laws, which regulate the 
pilotage of a vessel as it calls on a port, has been based on a historically 
heightened interest in local regulation.258  In the few cases that have 
addressed the constitutionality of extraterritorial pilotage regulations—
where the state’s pilotage laws are enforced beyond its territorial waters—
the courts have upheld these laws under the same rationale that justifies state 
action in the first instance: that states have a strong and unique local interest 
in regulating vessel pilotage in their waterways.259  These holdings are 
reinforced by Congress’s blanket delegation of the pilotage lawmaking 
power to the states in the Lighthouse Act.260  Although both the First and 
Fifth Circuits—which have directly addressed the issue—relied heavily on 
the Lighthouse Act’s delegation of power to the states in upholding 
extraterritorial pilotage regulations, only the First Circuit indicated that the 
outcome hinged on a determination as to whether the Lighthouse Act’s grant 
 
 257.  See PMSA II, 639 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 258.  See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1852).  In a case challenging the 
constitutionality of state pilotage regulations under the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court held 
that the regulations were not preempted, despite their direct regulation of interstate vessels engaged 
in maritime commerce, in light of their pertinence to such a unique local concern.  Id. at 319 (stating 
that the historical nature of pilotage laws is “local and not national; that it is likely to be the best 
provided for, not by one system, or plan of regulations, but by as many as the legislative discretion 
of the several States should deem applicable to the local peculiarities of the ports within their 
limits”). 
 259.  See Gillis v. Louisiana, 294 F.3d 755, 756 (5th Cir. 2002).  In Gillis, the Fifth Circuit upheld 
state pilotage regulations that reached as far as thirty miles from the Louisiana coastline.  See id. at 
756–57.  Louisiana’s territorial boundary in the gulf is farther than three miles under the SLA, but its 
pilotage regulations nonetheless extended beyond that boundary.  See id.  The court rejected 
plaintiffs’ argument that the SLA, by establishing a state boundary at three nautical miles from the 
baseline, had thereby limited state jurisdiction over pilotage regulations to that boundary.  See id. at 
761.  The court concluded that Congress did not intend to limit coastal states’ authority over pilotage 
regulations with the SLA, and that pilotage laws had historically rested within the jurisdiction of 
states.  See id.  The court also reasoned that Louisiana possessed a significant local interest in 
regulating the pilotage over the waters in question, an interest which outweighed plaintiffs’ argument 
that the authority conflicts generally with federal interests.  See id. at 762. 
 260.  Warner v. Dunlap, 532 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1976).  In Warner, the First Circuit upheld a 
Rhode Island pilotage regulation that reached Block Island Sound off the Rhode Island coast, which 
happened to be situated well beyond the state’s three-mile territorial limit.  Id. at 772.  The question 
turned on the “factual determination as to whether Block Island Sound is a ‘bay’ within the 
meaning” of the Lighthouse Act.  Id. at 768.  Implicitly, the First Circuit would not have upheld a 
similar extraterritorial regulation that was not expressly authorized by federal legislation.  Similarly, 
the Gillis court’s analysis of Louisiana’s pilotage regulation rested heavily on Congress’s intent to 
delegate the authority in the Lighthouse Act.  See Gillis, 294 F.3d at 761 (“Rather than a limited 
grant of authority to the states over the specified bodies of water, the [Lighthouse Act] has been 
interpreted as an expression of Congress’s general intent not to limit the power already held by the 
states unless otherwise provided by Congress.”).  Both the First and Fifth Circuit Courts’ emphasis 
of the Lighthouse Act’s express delegation of authority as a basis for upholding the state’s police 
power over pilotage may be a distinguishing feature that separates these pilotage cases from 
extraterritorial environmental regulations that may lack a similar delegation of power by Congress. 
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encompassed the body of water in question.261  Even though these decisions 
did not address whether states are able to ground extraterritorial pilotage 
regulations on local interest or historical practice alone (without the 
congressional grant in the Lighthouse Act), state pilotage regulation was 
nonetheless the historical practice before any ocean waters fell within state 
territory.262  Therefore, it is likely that the rationale supporting pilotage 
regulations—not the boundary defined in the SLA—is what should govern 
their reach. 
The purpose behind Congress’s enactment of the SLA also sheds some 
light on the question of its preemptive effect, because the statue was enacted 
with the purpose of expanding state jurisdiction,263 not limiting it.  Before 
the SLA became law, states did not have any territorial claim to the waters 
beyond their shores.264  The SLA was nonetheless enacted to expand state 
territorial jurisdiction to these waters for purposes of resource exploration, 
not to define a limit to its regulatory powers.265  In PMSA II, the Ninth 
Circuit aptly noted that arguments that the SLA was intended to set a 
regulatory boundary “reads too much into the SLA itself and what Congress 
itself intended to achieve in 1953.”266  In holding that the SLA does not, by 
itself, preempt the VFR, the Ninth Circuit noted that there is no case 
precedent striking down an extra-territorial state regulation on the basis of 
the boundaries created by the SLA alone.267  If anything, it noted, the 
authorities have been consistent in upholding state regulation beyond the 
boundary established by the SLA where the state’s interest in regulation was 
strong.268 
Because it is unlikely that the SLA impliedly preempts the VFR, it 
stands to reason that the question of whether California has the power to 
enact the VFR will hinge on historical practice and local interest grounds 
(similar to extraterritorial pilotage laws) and not the SLA’s territorial 
 
 261.  See supra note 260. 
 262.  Before passage of the SLA, a state’s border ended at the coastal baseline.  See supra notes 
133–42.  Nevertheless, state pilotage laws were upheld in Cooley in 1852.  See supra note 258.  
Therefore, from a historic perspective, all pilotage laws were extraterritorial at one time. 
 263.  See supra notes 135–42.  The SLA was designed to supersede the Supreme Court’s holding 
that California’s territory—including territory existing for resource-exploration purposes—ended at 
its shoreline.  See id. 
 264.  See supra notes 135–42. 
 265.  See supra notes 135–42. 
 266.  PMSA II, 639 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 267.  Id. at 1170. 
 268.  See id. at 1170–74 (citing, inter alia, Gillis v. Louisiana, 294 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 2002); 
Warner v. Dunlap, 532 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1976)). 
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boundaries.269  As will be shown, this analysis tracks the Supreme Court’s 
Jensen uniformity test, which is discussed below. 
D.   Federal Interest in Uniformity: Common Law Preemption                     
in Maritime Law 
General principles of maritime law developed as common law by the 
federal courts are frequently applied by courts as a separate constitutional 
preemption test.270  Therefore, even if a congressional statute or international 
framework does not itself preempt a state regulation, the federal laws may 
otherwise weigh as factors in making this final determination.271  This 
section considers whether the VFR may be preempted by federal maritime 
principles. 
1. State Regulation Is Not Afforded a Presumption Against 
Preemption when It Bears upon Maritime Commerce 
Whether California’s VFR are preempted under general maritime law is 
a question implicating principles of field preemption, which generally arises 
where a state “regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the 
Federal Government to occupy exclusively.”272  In cases where a state law is 
challenged under field preemption, the Supreme Court has frequently 
afforded state regulations a “presumption against pre-emption” if the states 
have a historic practice of regulating in the field.273 
Depending on how one frames the VFR—as air pollution regulations, on 
the one hand, or as regulations of maritime commerce, on the other—there 
may be a strong argument that California is regulating in a field historically 
placed in the realm of the states.  The Supreme Court has broadly 
pronounced that “[t]hroughout our history the several States have exercised 
their police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens.”274  Air 
pollution regulations have been historically considered an exercise of the 
state police power to enact health and safety legislation.275  This historical 
 
 269.  See infra notes 341–42 and accompanying text. 
 270.  See supra notes 73–112 and accompanying text. 
 271.  See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text. 
 272.  English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
 273.  See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 n.3 (2009).  This 
presumption is based on the Court’s deference to state powers under principles of federalism.  See id. 
(“We rely on the presumption because respect for the States as ‘independent sovereigns in our 
federal system’ leads us to assume that ‘Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of 
action.’[]  The presumption thus accounts for the historic presence of state law but does not rely on 
the absence of federal regulation.” (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))). 
 274.  Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475. 
 275.  See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) (“Legislation 
designed to free from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of 
even the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police power.”). 
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argument might favor California, because under general circumstances, 
where an area of law is implicated that “ha[s] been traditionally occupied by 
the States,” there is a presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt 
state action in the field.276  Such a presumption is overcome only where 
Congress has made “‘clear and manifest’” its intention to preempt state 
action.277 
However, these initial appearances may be misleading.  It is just as 
appropriate to frame the VFR as maritime commerce regulations as it is to 
frame them as air pollution regulations, particularly in light of the fact that 
they directly prescribe the type of fuel to be used by vessels engaged in 
maritime commerce in international waters off the coast of California.278  As 
fuel content regulations, the VFR directly impact the primary conduct of the 
vessels, but only indirectly impact air emissions.279  This is particularly true 
because the VFR require vessels to make determinations about whether to 
use the low-sulfur fuel or pay a fine, whether to use the coastal sea lanes 
where the VFR are applied or to create alternative shipping routes, and 
whether to continue to carry their cargos to California ports at all.  
Construed as extraterritorial regulations bearing upon maritime commerce, 
California’s claim to a historical presence in the field becomes suspect.280  
This tension was a key issue in PMSA II, which considered but declined to 
frame the VFR as a regulation of maritime commerce.281 
Moreover, even if the VFR are framed as air pollution regulations, they 
are not enforced in a vacuum.  Because they directly regulate the fuel 
content of ocean-going vessels,282 at a very minimum, they are air pollution 
regulations that substantially bear upon maritime commerce.  As such, both 
the state and federal governments have historically exercised concurrent 
jurisdiction in this field.283  The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
 
 276.  See English, 496 U.S. at 79 (“Where . . . the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted 
includes areas that have been traditionally occupied by the States, congressional intent to supersede 
state laws must be clear and manifest.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). This 
appears initially relevant because, under preemption principles, traditional state action in the field 
creates an assumption against preemption.  See id. 
 277.  See id. 
 278.  See supra notes 145, 163. 
 279.  See supra notes 172–93 and accompanying text. 
 280.  See PMSA II, 639 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 281.  Id. at 1167 (“While PMSA contends that the Vessel Fuel Rules operate in fields historically 
occupied by the federal government (e.g., maritime commerce, conduct at sea outside of state 
boundaries, and the definition of state boundaries), we agree with the District Court that these state 
regulations ultimately implicate the prevention and control of air pollution.”). 
 282.  See supra notes 145, 163. 
 283.  See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) (“In the 
exercise of [police] power [to regulate pollution], the states and their instrumentalities may act, in 
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Locke284 likely controls under such circumstances.  There, the State of 
Washington had enacted regulations to reduce oil tanker spills in its 
waters.285  At issue was whether the state’s regulations were afforded a 
presumption against preemption because they were enacted as health and 
safety laws.286  The Court held that because the oil tanker regulations also 
bore upon maritime commerce, they should not be afforded the presumption 
against preemption, stating that where laws: 
[B]ear upon national and international maritime commerce, . . . 
there is no beginning assumption that concurrent regulation by the 
State is a valid exercise of its police powers.  Rather, we must ask 
whether the local laws in question are consistent with the federal 
statutory structure, which has as one of its objectives a uniformity 
of regulation for maritime commerce.  No artificial presumption 
aids us in determining the scope of appropriate local regulation . . . 
[despite] the historic role of the States to regulate local ports and 
waters under appropriate circumstances.287 
The Locke Court held that the regulations, which required general 
navigation watch procedures, English language training for crew members, 
and maritime casualty reporting, were preempted despite the historical 
practice of state regulation of its local ports and waterways and the state 
interest in reducing the likelihood of toxic oil spills in its waters.288  
 
many areas of interstate commerce and maritime activities, concurrently with the federal 
government.” (emphasis added)).  In Huron, the Supreme Court upheld the criminal liability of a 
corporation that had violated a local ordinance limiting the amount of smoke that its vessel’s boilers 
could emit within the city of Detroit, even though the boilers were otherwise in compliance with 
federal law.  Id. at 444–47.  Not addressed was whether the same could be applied outside the city 
limits.  See generally id.  But see United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108–09 (2000) (holding, inter 
alia, that parts of the state of Washington’s oil tanker equipment and employment regulations, 
enacted to confront oil pollution concerns, were preempted by the uniformity demands of an 
overlapping statutory scheme set up by Congress). 
 284.  529 U.S. 89 (2000). 
 285.  Id. at 94. 
 286.  Id. at 108. 
 287.  Id. at 108–09 (emphasis added); see also Young, supra note 15, at 333–37, 337 n.420 
(noting that “[t]he Court has suggested that the presumption against preemption is not so weighty in 
areas of ‘unique federal concern’ warranting the creation of federal common law” in maritime (citing 
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1988))).  With this in mind, Young criticizes 
the Court’s approach, arguing that the presumption against preemption should nonetheless be 
preserved in light of federalism concerns: 
Congress’s critical role in preemption decisions makes preemption by federal common 
law highly suspect.  Both courts and commentators have noted the federalism concerns 
raised by formulation of federal law by a federal judiciary that incorporates none of the 
political safeguards of federalism; after all, “the States are represented in Congress but 
not in the federal courts.” 
Young, supra note 15, at 335–36 (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 n.9 
(1981)). 
 288.  See Locke, 529 U.S. at 115–17. 
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Significantly, the Court did so where, as here, the state contended that 
congressional action had been insufficient in the field and that the state was 
appropriately supplementing federal law to reduce pollution in its waters.289 
In light of Locke, which appears to apply broadly to maritime cases,290 
the general presumption against preemption afforded to state regulation is 
inapplicable here because California’s regulation bears upon maritime 
commerce, even if the regulation involves a traditional state concern.291  
Because the Ninth Circuit in PMSA II afforded the VFR a presumption 
against preemption,292 it likely erred under current Supreme Court case 
law.293  Rather, in cases where the presumption against preemption is not 
applied, the federal interest in the uniformity of maritime law is balanced 
with the state’s local interest in the regulation, particularly as outlined in 
 
 289.  See id. at 117 (“When one contemplates the weight and immense mass of oil ever in transit 
by tankers, the oil’s proximity to coastal life, and its destructive power even if a spill occurs far upon 
the open sea, international, federal, and state regulation may be insufficient protection.  Sufficiency, 
however, is not the question before us.  The issue is not adequate regulation but political 
responsibility; and it is, in large measure, for Congress and the Coast Guard to confront whether 
their regulatory scheme, which demands a high degree of uniformity, is adequate.”). 
 290.  See id. at 108 (“The state laws now in question bear upon national and international 
maritime commerce, and in this area there is no beginning assumption that concurrent regulation by 
the State is a valid exercise of its police powers.” (emphasis added)). 
 291.  See supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
 292.  PMSA II, 639 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 293.  In support of its determination to apply the presumption against preemption, the Ninth 
Circuit cited Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), which held that failure to warn civil claims 
brought under state law were not preempted by warning standards developed by the FDA scheme.  
PMSA II, 639 F.3d at 1166.  Wyeth held that the presumption against preemption applied to state 
drug regulations because of the historical state practice of state health and safety regulations—even 
though the federal government had a long-standing presence in the drug regulation business vis-à-vis 
the FDA.  See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194–95.  The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Wyeth, to the exclusion 
of Locke, was likely in error.  Wyeth did not overrule Locke.  Rather, in both cases, the Supreme 
Court weighed the varying historical state and federal practices and came to a determination about 
whether the state’s historical presence in the field was significant enough to justify a presumption 
against preemption.  In Locke, the Court looked to maritime commerce and held that the state’s 
presence in the field of port and waterway regulation was not substantial or long-standing enough to 
justify a presumption against preemption where its regulations bore upon maritime commerce.  See 
supra notes 287–92 and accompanying text.  On the other hand, the Wyeth Court concluded that, as 
to the field of drug manufacture and sale, the historical state presence was enough to afford state law 
a presumption against preemption.  See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194–95.  The difference between these 
two cases was not that Wyeth changed the rule to be applied.  See id.; see also supra notes 287–92 
and accompanying text.  Instead, the difference was that there was a different outcome to the initial 
question of whether a state’s historical presence in a particular field was significant enough to justify 
an artificial presumption against preemption.  See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194–95; see also supra notes 
287–92 and accompanying text.  Because PMSA II was a case involving state regulations bearing 
upon maritime commerce—not drug manufacture and sale—it is more appropriate to apply Locke, 
not Wyeth.  See PMSA II, 639 F.3d at 1158. 
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Jensen and its progeny, without the benefit of an artificial presumption 
against preemption.294 
2. Balancing the Federal Interest in Uniformity with the State’s 
Interest in Regulation 
Article III’s grant of maritime jurisdiction has been interpreted to 
include a substantive federal lawmaking power, under which state regulation 
may supplement the substantive law, but may not interfere with the federal 
interest in the uniformity of maritime law in its interstate and international 
relations.295  Discerning the proper application of this uniformity 
requirement has been compared to the navigation of “a sailboat into a fog 
bank.”296  This federal interest may be stronger in some cases than others, 
and the general approach is to balance the state interest in the regulation 
against the federal interest in the uniformity of maritime law.297 
Considering California’s interest first, the state’s vessel fuel regulations 
were seemingly made with good intentions and pollution concerns in 
mind.298  Air pollution in the Southern California region is hugely 
problematic.299  CARB predicted that its strict fuel standards would save 
hundreds of lives that would otherwise end prematurely as a result of toxic 
diesel emissions.300  Although the science of this prediction is under 
 
 294.  See supra notes 73–112 and accompanying text. 
 295.  See supra notes 73–112 and accompanying text. 
 296.  Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 624 (1st Cir. 1994) (“[O]ne might 
tack a sailboat into a fog bank with more confidence.”). 
 297.  See supra notes 100–12 and accompanying text. 
 298.  CARB predicted that the enactment of its Vessel Fuel Rules would annually prevent 500 
premature deaths that are caused by these SOx, NOx, and PM emissions.  Final Statement for 
Reasons of Rulemaking, supra note 172, at 47. 
 299.  Any Southern California resident, including this author, can speak fluently about smog 
clouds in Los Angeles that occasionally are so thick they inhibit views of the skyline.  Indeed, Los 
Angeles smog has become a fixture of the region’s identity.  See, e.g., B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., 
California Smog Cloud Is Cleaning Up Its Act, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1995/11/03/us/california-smog-cloud-is-cleaning-up-its-act.html (“The noxious haze of smog that 
hangs over Los Angeles and the surrounding urban basin has long been the thickest, unhealthiest and 
most infamous in the country, as much a symbol of the city to many people as Hollywood.”).  
However, one need not look only to anecdotes.  According to the American Lung Association, which 
publishes an annual air quality report, California is home to eight of the top ten “most polluted 
cities” in the nation for ozone pollution; five of the top ten for long-term particulate matter pollution 
(measured over one year); and seven of the top ten for short-term particulate matter pollution 
(measured over a twenty-four hour period).  State of the Air 2010, AM. LUNG ASS’N, 
http://www.lungusa.org/assets/documents/publications/state-of-the-air/state-of-the-air-report-
2010.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2012).  In each of these categories, California’s largest city, Los 
Angeles, is ranked first, second, and fourth respectively.  Id.  Only one other city, Bakersfield, 
California, can claim the honor of being ranked in the top five for each category, and this city is also 
located in Southern California.  Id. 
 300.  See also California Environmental Protection Agency News Release, supra note 161 (“An 
estimated 3,600 premature deaths between 2009 and 2015 will be avoided, and the cancer risk 
associated with the emissions from these vessels would be reduced by over 80 percent. . . . Diesel 
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dispute,301 it is beyond the scope of this Comment to engage in a separate 
analysis of the science or to take a specific position on whether the remedy 
is prudent.  Rather, this Comment assumes that the pollution concerns raised 
by California about diesel emissions from ocean-going vessels are legitimate 
and that these regulations will help to reduce that problem.  On the other 
hand, air pollution does not uniquely impact California.302  Nor is ocean-
going air pollution a unique occurrence in the state.303  Air quality has been a 
matter of national focus for decades, as demonstrated by Congress’s interest 
in passing of the CAA in 1970 and major amendments designed to broaden 
its reach in 1990.304   These facts undercut California’s argument that its VFR 
should be upheld on grounds that they are unique and comparable to the 
local interests that support state pilotage regulations.305  State authority to 
make pilotage laws is based upon a determination that state ports and 
 
exhaust contains a variety of harmful gases and over 40 other known cancer-causing compounds.  
Currently in California, diesel PM emissions from ocean-going vessels expose more than twenty-
seven million people or 80% of California’s total population, to cancer risk levels at or above 10 
chances in a million.”). 
 301.  See James E. Enstrom, Critique of CARB Diesel Science, 1998–2010, CALIFORNIA 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AIR RESOURCES BOARD (Feb. 26, 2010), 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/research/health/pm-mort/enstrom.pdf (arguing evidence does not support the 
contention that PM emissions result in premature deaths in California); Henry I. Miller & James E. 
Enstrom, California’s Diesel Regulations Are Hot Air, FORBES.COM (June 9, 2010), 
http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/08/california-diesel-regulation-pollution-opinions-columnists-
henry-i-miller-james-e-enstrom.html (“[K]ey CARB research staff and CARB-funded scientists 
withheld or obfuscated epidemiologic findings that conflicted with their preconceived conclusions 
about PM2.5 health effects.  In spite of the above null epidemiologic evidence and almost 150 pages 
of critical comments submitted to CARB in July 2008, the October 2008 Final CARB Staff Report 
(the ‘Tran Report,’ named after lead staffer Hien Tran) still claimed that PM2.5 and diesel 
particulate matter were responsible for the above-mentioned number of premature deaths.”).  In fact, 
a lead staffer who informed CARB’s report, Hien Tran, was demoted by CARB after it was revealed 
he had falsified his credentials, although CARB was not informed about this discovery until after its 
vote on diesel regulations.  See id.; Lois Henry, Valley Air Quality Rules Remain Awfully Murky, 
THE BAKERSFIELD CALIFORNIAN, Sept. 26, 2011, http://www.bakersfield.com/news/columnist/ 
henry/x706716939/Xopxopxopopxopxopxopxopxopx.  James Enstrom, a UCLA research professor, 
was not reappointed to his position after the university made a determination that his research did not 
align with the “mission of the department.”  See Kelly Zhou, UCLA Researcher James Enstrom Not 
Reappointed to Position, DAILY BRUIN, Aug. 30, 2010, http://www.dailybruin.com/index.php/ 
article/2010/08/ucla_researcher_james_enstrom_not_reappointed_to_position. 
 302.  See State of the Air 2010, supra note 299.  The American Lung Association’s top ten list for 
“most polluted cities” under all three air pollution categories includes, among California cities, 
Pittsburgh, PA; Birmingham, AL; Salt Lake City, UT; Phoenix, AZ; Cincinnati, OH; Houston, TX; 
and Charlotte, NC.  See id. 
 303.  See, e.g., Lee van der Voo, Seattle-to-Alaska Cruise Ships Pose Pollution Threat in Puget 
Sound, MY EDMOND NEWS, Aug. 2008, http://myedmondsnews.com/2010/08/seattle-to-alaska-
cruise-ships-pose-pollution-threat-in-puget-sound/#ixzz1HGAIE9UF. 
 304.  See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 305.  Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. 
Goldstene, No. 2:09-cv-01151-MCE-EFB (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2009). 
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internal waterways are so peculiarly unique to their location that the state 
has a heightened interest in such a characteristically local concern—so much 
so that Congress would be incompetent to act in the place of the states.306  
Surely, the argument goes, the federal government would not be able to 
create a one-size-fits-all pilotage regime when internal waterways are so 
unique from one bay or canal to the next.307  However, CARB has not 
argued that the way in which California is polluted or the makeup of its 
coastline is somehow so unique that it renders Congress incompetent to set 
national standards for the regulation of vessel fuel.  To the contrary, 
California has virtually made the opposite case: that it is regulating as long 
as it disagrees with Congress’s policy judgment in setting laxer standards,308 
and that the state will quickly defer to Congress once it decides to toughen 
its national standards.309  Such a contention would be completely foreign to a 
pilotage regulation context, because Congress is not competent to make 
pilotage regulations.  Additionally, unlike pilotage laws, where Congress 
delegated the entire field to the states with the Lighthouse Act, the fuel 
content of ocean-going vessels is already regulated by the federal 
government in Annex VI of MARPOL.310  These distinctions weaken 
California’s argument that the VFR are necessitated by factors that are 
unique to its locality, rather than that they address a problem that can be 
addressed nationally, particularly in light of their bearing upon international 
ship traffic in extraterritorial waters.  In sum, although Los Angeles has been 
on the receiving end of a significant amount of air pollutants emitted by 
large vessels,311  California’s strong interest in pollution reductions is 
mitigated by the fact that it is not uniquely competent to make those 
regulations. 
The state’s asserted interest in favor of regulating must be balanced with 
the federal interest in a uniform, national policy.  Where the state’s 
 
 306.  See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1852).  A requirement for a federal standard for 
pilotage laws based on uniformity interests was not contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution, 
the Cooley Court reasoned, because of the obviousness of the local state interest in setting local 
pilotage rules that were based on the peculiarities of their ports: 
Indeed the necessity of conforming regulations of pilotage to the local peculiarities of 
each port, and the consequent impossibility of having its charges uniform throughout the 
United States, would be sufficient of itself to prove that they could not have been 
intended to be embraced within this clause of the Constitution; for it cannot be supposed 
uniformity was required, when it must have been known to be impracticable. 
Id. at 314. 
 307.  See id. 
 308.  See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 309.  See supra notes 250–57 and accompanying text. 
 310.  See supra notes 221–31 and accompanying text. 
 311.  See Traci Watson, Ship Pollution Clouds USA’s Skies, USA TODAY (Aug. 30, 2004), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-08-30-ship-pollution_x.htm (“[The Southern 
California] region includes the nation’s two busiest ports, Long Beach and Los Angeles.  The vessels 
there produce more pollution than any other single source in the area.  Their emissions help push 
smog and soot to unhealthy levels in the region.”). 
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regulation is of vessel “primary conduct,” it will present the most direct risk 
of preemption because of its likely interference with the federal uniformity 
interest.312  More specifically, the First Circuit in Ballard defined “primary 
conduct” as the “out-of-court behavior of ships.”313  Here, the VFR directly 
regulate the type of fuel used by foreign- and national-flagged vessels 
engaged in international maritime commerce.314  Unlike Ballard, which 
upheld a Rhode Island oil spill liability law because it merely tinkered with 
the scope of damages that could be recovered for conduct that was already 
illegal under federal law,315 the California regulation actually creates new 
grounds for liability for conduct that is otherwise legal (the use of high-
sulfur diesel oil).  Additionally, in response to the VFR, vessels are actually 
changing course and avoiding federal shipping lanes because of the cost of 
compliance,316 a tangible illustration of the state’s impact on the primary 
conduct of these vessels.  Although the Ninth Circuit in PMSA II found that 
increased compliance costs were insubstantial,317 it is unlikely that shippers 
would be going to such lengths to create avoidance routes if the cost of 
compliance was truly negligible.  Therefore, as an initial matter, the VFR 
have resulted in substantial disruptions to shipping routes, a change in the 
fuel required once a vessel enters the RCW, and an increase in the cost of 
commerce with the United States through its California ports—all tangible  
illustrations of the VFR’s interference with the federal interest in the 
harmony and uniformity of the maritime law.318 
Moreover, congressional legislation or federal treaties, if not preemptive 
in and of themselves, may nonetheless function as expressions of a federal 
interest in the field and weigh as factors in this analysis.319  As discussed 
above, the SLA setting state territorial boundaries at three miles from the 
baseline probably does not preempt all extraterritorial state legislation by 
itself,320 but the Supreme Court has used the territorial boundary that the 
SLA creates as a factor in applying the uniformity-balancing test.  In United 
States v. Locke, the Court explained that it had upheld a tug escort regulation 
 
 312.  See supra notes 100–12 and accompanying text. 
 313.  See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 314.  See supra notes 163–71, 201 and accompanying text; infra note 333 and accompanying text. 
 315.  See supra note 107. 
 316.  See supra notes 183–93 and accompanying text. 
 317.  See PMSA II, 639 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that “it does not appear that such 
compliance would be technically impossible or even especially challenging” in light of the district 
court’s findings that the increased cost of compliance is approximately $6.00 per twenty-foot 
shipping container, or about 12.5 cents per plasma television). 
 318.  See supra notes 183–93. 
 319.  See generally infra notes 322–40. 
 320.  See supra Part IV.C. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/14/2012  2:25 PM 
 
694 
in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.321 because it did not “affect vessel operations 
outside the jurisdiction” or “modify its primary conduct” outside the state’s 
territorial waters.322  The Ninth Circuit has made similar pronouncements 
about the importance of the distinction between territorial and non-territorial 
waters when it upheld state pollution regulations within state territory.  In 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, the Ninth Circuit upheld the legality of 
an Alaskan regulation barring certain polluting activities of oil tankers 
within state territorial waters, but the court made a point of adding that the 
federal interest in uniform environmental regulations is “paramount” beyond 
the three-mile boundary and indicated that the outcome of the case may well 
have been different if the regulation had extended beyond the state’s 
territorial boundary.323  “Of course,” the court noted, “as to environmental 
regulation of deep ocean waters, the federal interest in uniformity is 
paramount.  Such regulation in most cases needs to be exclusive because the 
only hope of achieving protection of the environment beyond our nation’s 
jurisdiction is through international cooperation.”324  The Hammond court is 
unclear if it is broadly referring to all waters beyond the three-mile boundary 
as “deep ocean waters,” which would state a per se rule that the federal 
interest is paramount beyond this boundary.325  It is nevertheless apparent 
 
 321.  435 U.S. 151 (1978). 
 322.  United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 112–13 (2000).  In fact, the Supreme Court explained 
that “limited extraterritorial effect” on a Washington tug escort requirement in its decision in Ray v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).  There, the Court held that a Washington state 
regulation requiring tug escorts within state territorial waters in Puget Sound was not preempted by a 
federal interest in uniformity.  Id. at 151–53.  The Locke Court reasoned that the tug escort 
regulation, as well as pilotage laws generally, are not preempted because of their limited effect on 
the conduct of vessels beyond state territorial waters.  Locke, 529 U.S. at 112 (“[L]imited 
extraterritorial effect, not requiring the [vessel] to modify its primary conduct outside the specific 
body of water purported to justify the local rule. . . . Limited extraterritorial effect explains why Ray 
upheld a state rule requiring a tug escort for certain vessels, and why state rules requiring a 
registered vessel (i.e., one involved in foreign trade) to take on a local pilot have historically been 
allowed.” (internal citations omitted)).  The Court made a similar determination in Askew v. 
American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 339 (1973), and upheld Florida oil spill liability 
regulations, yet stated that even where the regulations fall within state boundaries, they still must be 
consistent with the principles espoused in Jensen: 
[A] State, in the exercise of its police power, may establish rules applicable on land and 
water within its limits, even though these rules incidentally affect maritime affairs, 
provided that the state action does not contravene any acts of Congress, nor work any 
prejudice to the characteristic features of the maritime law, nor interfere with its proper 
harmony and uniformity in its international and interstate relations.  It was decided that 
the state legislation encountered none of these objections. 
Id. at 339 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
 323.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 495 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[T]here is no 
need for strict uniformity in regulating pollutant discharges into the territorial waters.  To the 
contrary, Congress has repeatedly recognized the need for collaborative federal/state regulation of 
the marine environment within three miles of shore.” (emphasis added)). 
 324.  Id. at 492 n.12. 
 325.  The federal government has claimed territorial jurisdiction over the first twelve miles 
beyond the baseline and granted the states a limited territorial jurisdiction over the first three of those 
twelve.  See supra note 115.  Therefore, if Hammond stands for the principle that the federal 
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that the Hammond court is reasoning that the federal uniformity interest 
becomes much weightier as the state’s regulation extends beyond its three-
mile boundary, to the point of becoming completely paramount. 
Although there is some case precedent upholding a state’s exercise of 
non-environmental state police powers beyond the three-mile territorial 
boundary, these cases are distinguishable.  In Pacific Merchant Shipping 
Ass’n v. Aubry,326 the Ninth Circuit upheld California labor laws applied to 
vessels not engaged in interstate navigation, that spent 90% of their time 
moored in a California port, and that employed only California residents.327  
The Supreme Court has upheld the criminal prosecution of a Florida citizen 
by the state of Florida for violating fishing regulations applied in waters 
beyond the state’s territorial boundaries.328  State pilotage laws have been 
upheld beyond state boundaries.329  And the Supreme Court of Alaska 
upheld state crab fishing regulations that applied to waters beyond the state’s 
territory, but narrowly construed the regulations so that they would not apply 
to foreign nationals.330  However, with the exception of the pilotage cases—
in which pilotage laws were upheld in light of the uniquely heightened local 
interest and historical practice331—federal courts have upheld the application 
 
government has exclusive jurisdiction over all waters beyond the three-mile boundary because they 
are international waters, see Hammond, 726 F.2d at 492 n.12, then it is not based on an entirely 
accurate footing. 
 326.  918 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 327.  Id.  Balancing state and federal interests, the Court concluded that the narrow circumstances 
of the case—where the law would make little impact on interstate or international maritime 
commerce, but only affect California citizens—warranted upholding the regulation.  Id. at 1424–25 
(“We conclude that the balance tips in favor of California in this case.  Under California law, the  
Labor Commission is charged with enforcing state wage provisions to ensure the health, safety, and 
welfare of resident employees. . . . [Here] the record indicates that the maritime employees involved 
in this case are California residents, were interviewed and hired in California, and pay California 
taxes.  Their contacts with the state are quite close: the vessels involved in this case do not make 
coastwise, intercoastal, or foreign voyages; [the vessel] is moored in a California harbor 90 percent 
of the time and works exclusively on oil rigs off the California coast; and [the vessel] is stationed 
exclusively off the California coast and visits only California ports.”). 
 328.  Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941) (“If the United States may control the conduct of 
its citizens upon the high seas, we see no reason why the State of Florida may not likewise govern 
the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters in which the State has a 
legitimate interest and where there is no conflict with acts of Congress.”).  The Supreme Court of 
Florida came to a similar conclusion in a case involving the prosecution of an American citizen for 
burglary and assault on a cruise vessel that had departed and returned to a Florida port.  See State v. 
Stepansky, 761 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2000) (upholding the prosecution of an American citizen for an 
assault and burglary committed on a cruise ship located one-hundred miles off of Florida’s coast at 
the time of the crime and that had departed and returned to a Florida port). 
 329.  See supra notes 258–68. 
 330.  State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, Uri 
v. Alaska, 429 U.S. 806 (1976). 
 331.  See supra notes 258–68 and accompanying text. 
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of state regulations beyond a state’s territorial boundary only where the 
regulation has applied to United States citizens or residents, or where the 
regulation applied within the territorial jurisdiction of the state.332  
Conversely, they have never done so where the regulation bearing upon 
maritime commerce was applied to noncitizens beyond the state’s boundary.  
Here, CARB’s VFR are applied to foreign-flagged vessels in extraterritorial 
waters.333  Therefore, the extraterritorial application of the VFR to all vessels 
is novel and could not be upheld under these case precedents. 
In addition to the VFR’s weakness on these extraterritoriality grounds, 
the United States has already set its own fuel standards under MARPOL 
Annex VI, which are notably much laxer.334  Even if the standards 
promulgated under Annex VI are not themselves intended to preempt state 
regulations—an arguable point335—they are nonetheless an expression of 
federal policy considerations in the field of vessel fuel content.  Moreover, 
Congress and the EPA have thus far made a decision to enforce the Annex 
VI rules against U.S.-flagged vessels only, in large part because the EPA has 
questioned its authority to enforce fuel content regulations against foreign 
vessels.336  California has thus asserted a power to regulate the conduct of 
foreign-flagged vessels where the EPA has been reluctant, which may 
further undermine the United States’ international position and interfere with 
its interest in a uniform application of maritime law. 
The Ninth Circuit in PMSA II, while recognizing that California’s 
regulatory scheme “pushes a state’s legal authority to its very limits,” took a 
different approach to these cases,337 holding that CARB’s VFR are not 
preempted under general principles of maritime law.338  It did so by applying 
cases upholding state environmental regulations that applied to foreign-
flagged vessels,339 and cases upholding environmental regulations applied to 
 
 332.  See infra notes 339–43. 
 333.  See supra notes 161–71 and accompanying text. 
 334.  See supra note 223. 
 335.  See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 336.  See supra note 228. 
 337.  PMSA II, 639 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 338.  Id. at 1181–82. 
 339.  See, e.g., PMSA II, 639 F.3d at 1170–71 (citing Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941)).  
There, the court cited Skiriotes, which upheld Florida’s sponge fishing regulation applied to possible 
extraterritorial conduct, for the principle that state regulations may reach beyond their territorial 
boundary.  Id.  The Skiriotes decision, however, expressly stated that it was contemplating the 
permissibility of the regulation in the context of its application to Florida citizens.  See Skiriotes, 313 
U.S. at 76 (“[I]t would not follow that the State could not prohibit its own citizens from the use of 
the described divers’ equipment at that place.  No question as to the authority of the United States 
over these waters, or over the sponge fishery, is here involved.  No right of a citizen of any other 
State is here asserted.  The question is solely between appellant and his own State.”).  The Court’s 
reliance on Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass’n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1990), is similarly 
problematic because Aubry contemplated the permissibility of the state overtime pay laws in terms 
of its application to California residents only.  See id. at 1414 (“[A]ll . . . employees [affected by the 
California regulation] . . . are California residents who live in California when not on board ship.  
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conduct outside the state’s territorial jurisdiction.340  But there appears to be 
no precedent, with the exception of pilotage laws,341 where state regulations 
were upheld when they were applied to foreign-nationals or vessels in 
extraterritorial waters.  Indeed, that is the unprecedented nature of this case.  
The PMSA II court “acknowledge[d] that these various decisions [to which it 
cited] may be distinguishable on a variety of grounds,” but nonetheless 
concluded that their general thrust pointed to a holding in favor of 
California, especially in light of the “effects” of vessel pollution in 
California.342  In doing so, the court set new precedent, but may have 
 
The workers are hired in California, receive paychecks at California addresses, and pay California 
taxes.”).  This factor is critical, as Fuller v. Golden Age Fisheries, 14 F.3d 1405 (9th Cir. 1994), 
considered a similar overtime pay law enacted by the state of Alaska, but distinguished Aubry on the 
ground that the regulation applied to non-Alaska residents.  See id. at 1409 (holding that the Alaska 
overtime pay law was preempted).  Moreover, State v. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2000), 
which upheld the criminal prosecution of a U.S. citizen for extraterritorial conduct occurring aboard 
a cruise ship that had departed from Florida, was not confronted with the applicability of Florida’s 
criminal laws to foreigners on the high seas.  See PMSA II, 639 F.3d at 1172 (citing Stepansky, 761 
So. 2d at 1029–37). 
 340.  The PMSA II panel cites the Supreme Court’s Huron decision for the principle that a state 
may regulate air pollution caused by foreign-flagged vessels.  See PMSA II, 639 F.3d at 1171 (citing 
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 441 (1960) (upholding a smoke 
abatement law applied to ships docked within the city’s port)).  However, this regulation was not 
applied to vessels outside the state’s territorial limits, but only to vessels docked inside the city of 
Detroit.  Huron, 362 U.S. at 441.  Similarly, the panel cites to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 
726 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984), for the same principle, although this case addressed only the 
applicability of the state’s regulation of ballast discharge from oil tanks within the territorial waters 
of the state.  See PMSA II, 639 F.3d at 1180 (citing Hammond, 726 F.2d at 484–501). 
 341.  As discussed supra notes 305–18 and accompanying text, the paramount local interest 
involved in pilotage regulation makes these laws distinguishable from other regulations where 
Congress is competent to act and has acted, as with vessel fuel content regulations. 
 342.  PMSA II, 639 F.3d at 1181.  In upholding the VFR, the PMSA II court heavily relied on the 
applicability of the “effects” test commonly used with regard to regulations by one state affecting 
another state.  See id. at 1167 (“Applying this effects test to the Vessel Fuel Rules, we conclude that 
there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to both the effects of the fuel use governed by 
California’s regulations on the health and well-being of the state’s residents as well as the actual 
impact of these regulations on maritime and foreign commerce.”).  In support of its application of 
this test, the court cited Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911).  PMSA II, 639 F.3d at 1170 
(stating that “Justice Holmes observed that ‘[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to 
produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm 
as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him within its power’” 
(citing Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 285)).  However, Strassheim was a case addressing a state criminal 
law’s applicability to conduct occurring in another state, and was not decided in a maritime context.  
See Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 284–85.  Indeed, the applicability of the “effects test” is uncommon in a 
maritime preemption context, if it is applicable at all.  This author found no prior federal circuit 
court decision that held that the test should be applied in a maritime context.  However, there are 
some examples of its application in state court.  See, e.g., State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530, 555 
(Alaska 1976) (applying an effects test to determine whether Alaska’s extraterritorial crab fishing 
regulations were preempted where they applied to U.S. citizens).  The panel ultimately applied the 
following test: “[A] state may regulate conduct occurring outside of its territorial boundaries if the 
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overlooked some critical distinctions in the case law that would have 
required a different outcome.343 
If PMSA II is upheld, it will strongly tilt the scales in favor of state 
regulatory powers in matters bearing upon maritime commerce.344  A broad 
reading of PMSA II could authorize a number of new state regulatory 
schemes as long as the state is able to frame the purpose of the regulation in 
terms of traditional state police powers (health and safety laws).345  The 
thrust of the Jensen line of cases could therefore be transformed, leading to 
an explosion of state maritime regulation by affording states a strong 
presumption against preemption when states are able to frame their 
regulations in these terms.  Such an outcome would have far-reaching 
consequences, and would likely result in the development of the very 
patchwork of state maritime regulations that was once thought preempted by 
general principles of maritime law.346 
 
conduct has (or is intended to have) a substantial effect within the territory and the regulation itself is 
otherwise reasonable.”  PMSA II, 639 F.3d at 1171 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402(1)(c), 403 (1987)).  The panel concluded the 
regulation would not be preempted under this approach.  Id.  A strong argument can be made in 
California’s favor under the “effects test” approach, as fuel emissions occurring outside its 
boundaries substantially affect the state as the polluted air drifts onto its shores.  However, the 
application of this test in a maritime preemption context (rather than an interstate context) is 
probably uncommon for a reason: its principles could be used to justify virtually limitless state 
regulation.  How far out to sea might California plausibly claim to have the power to regulate under 
this approach?  The air that comes to California’s shores certainly does not originate twenty-four 
miles from the baseline.  Could California regulate the fuel used by vessels across the Pacific 
Ocean?  Today, California is currently considering the extension of the regulated waters to forty-
eight miles from its baseline, a logical extension under the “effects test” approach because conduct 
occurring between twenty-four and forty-eight miles is substantially affecting California.  See supra 
note 192 and accompanying text.  Nevertheless, to the extent that the effects test is applicable, it is 
applicable only as an additional hurdle to California’s regulatory authority, not in place of all other 
hurdles.  The panel in PMSA II recognized this and applied the Jensen test.  See PMSA II, 639 F.3d 
at 1178–81. 
 343.  See supra notes 321–42; see also PMSA II, 639 F.3d at 1172–73 (citing State v. Bundrant, 
546 P.2d 530, as persuasive authority in support of the principle that a state environmental regulation 
may sometimes reach beyond the SLA’s territorial boundary).  The PMSA II panel did not address 
the Bundrant court’s narrow construction of the regulation, where it prevented its application to 
foreign nationals.  Id. at 1154.  Rather than upholding a broad application of the state’s regulations, 
the Bundrant court narrowly construed the state’s crab fishing rules as applicable to U.S. citizens 
only, reasoning that a broader construction of the regulation would have been preempted by federal 
interests in uniformity.  See supra notes 240–44 and accompanying text. 
 344.  The PMSA II court appears to acknowledge the unprecedented reach of California’s 
regulations, and thus the impact of its decision here.  See PMSA II, 639 F.3d at 1181 (“We are 
clearly dealing with an expansive and even possibly unprecedented state regulatory scheme.”). 
 345.  The Jensen Court overturned New York’s worker’s compensation regime as it applied to 
ships calling on the state’s ports.  See supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text.  As here, the state 
regulation addressed in Jensen involved a field where the state could claim a historic presence and a 
weighty interest in acting.  S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), superseded by statute, 
Longshoremen’s & Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, Pub. L. 98-426, 44 Stat. 1424 (1984) 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (2006)). 
 346.  The PMSA II panel appears to reject the contention that the mere potential for a patchwork 
of state regulations may itself require preemption.  See PMSA II, 639 F.3d at 1181 (“[I]t appears that 
no other state in the Union has adopted, or is likely to adopt before the full implementation of the 
DO NOT DELETE 3/14/2012  2:25 PM 
[Vol. 39: 645, 2012] Overreach on the High Seas? 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
699 
V.  CONCLUSION 
California’s VFR are a bold claim of state power to regulate in 
maritime, even when the affected conduct occurs outside its territory.347  
Although an argument can be made that the VFR are a necessary response to 
California’s unique air pollution problems,348 they may nonetheless conflict 
with congressional legislation, international frameworks, and general 
principles of maritime law.349  This Comment does not take a position on the 
wisdom of California’s policy determinations, and it is conceivable that the 
VFR represent a needed change in the nation’s pollution control laws in light 
of the concerns raised by CARB.350  If so, and if the VFR are indeed 
preempted, the impetus will fall to federal and state policymakers to address 
the consequences.  California could pass a new version of the VFR that 
better conforms to federal interests in uniformity, or the United States could 
further bolster its regulations under MARPOL.  The resolution of this issue 
will be far-reaching, as it will set precedent regarding the limits of an 
individual state’s regulatory powers in this field.  As California goes, so will 
the nation. 
Bradley D. Easterbrooks* 
 
 
ECA, any ‘competing or conflicting’ fuel use requirements.”).  However, it was not the 
materialization, but the simple possibility that other states might develop a patchwork of worker’s 
compensation schemes that was referenced by Jensen in overturning New York’s worker’s 
compensation regime as it was applied to ocean-going vessels.  See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 217 (“If New 
York can subject foreign ships coming into her ports to such obligations . . . other States may do 
likewise.”). 
 347.  See supra notes 161–71 and accompanying text. 
 348.  See supra notes 298–304 and accompanying text. 
 349.  See supra notes 199–346 and accompanying text. 
 350.  See supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 *   J.D. Candidate, 2012, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.A. in Political Science and 
History, 2007, Boston College.  I would like to thank Professor Robert Anderson IV for introducing 
me to this topic and for his encouragement.  The purpose of this Comment is to raise and analyze the 
complicated legal questions arising from California’s novel regulatory scheme, not to assess whether 
California’s approach is prudent.  The author, a Southern California resident, can personally attest to 
the need to confront air pollution in the region and hopes that the legal tensions discussed in this 
Comment will be resolved in a way that satisfies both state and federal interests. 
